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COMMENTS
HOW MANY IS "ANY'?: INTERPRETING
§ 2252A'S UNIT OF PROSECUTION FOR
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION
CHRISTINA M. COPSEY*
Individuals convicted for possession of child pornography should not receive
drastically different sentences based solely on the statute under which they are
convicted. Yet courts interpret the current statutory scheme in this way.
Depending on which of two statutes a prosecutor chooses to bring charges
under, and on which circuit has jurisdiction, the same defendant could receive
one count of possession-or ten counts or one hundred counts. This
discrepancy results from a slight difference in phrasing between two near-
identical statutes: 18 U.S. C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
Under § 2252, a defendant may only be convicted of one count of possession
for all illicit materials simultaneously possessed in one place, and sentencing is
tailored to the number of images possessed, among other factors. Under
§ 2252A, however, individuals can be convicted of a separate count for each
physical storage device or each type of storage medium utilized. Both statutes
are currently in effect, leading to the potential for widely disparate
punishments for similar levels of possession.
Based on the application of various canons of construction, this Comment
argues that § 2252A does not authorize separate punishment for separate
devices or storage media types simultaneously possessed in one place.
Furthermore, this Comment argues that it is neither fair nor productive to
penalize a defendant for choosing a certain organizational system rather than
for the underlying crime of possessing child pornography.
* Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 63, J.D. Candidate, 2014,
American University Washington College of Law. Thank you to the staff of the American
University Law Review and to Professor Ira Robbins for making this Comment
possible.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine an individual has ten images of child pornography stored
on a desktop computer. How many crimes of possession has he
committed? Has he committed ten crimes of possessing one image
each? Or, has he committed only a single crime of child
pornography possession? Next, imagine that the individual moves
one image onto an external hard drive and another image onto a
second external hard drive. Has he now committed two crimes, one
for each type of storage medium (i.e., one count for the external hard
drives and a second count for the original computer)? Alternatively,
has he committed three crimes, one for each physical storage device
(i.e., one count for each drive and a third count for the computer)?
Should a different and harsher punishment result merely because the
individual moved two images from one device to another?
Depending on the jurisdiction and statute involved, the answer to
how many crimes have been committed may be any of the above.1
With the rise of the Internet, the child pornography market has
surged, making it increasingly difficult for law enforcement to
identify and prosecute individuals involved in the child pornography
industry.2 To make matters more difficult, advances in technology,
such as the ability to digitally alter electronic media, can frustrate the
government's ability to prove that an actual minor is depicted in a
given image or video. For example, images of adults can be digitally
altered to make the adults appear younger, innocent images of
1. See generally Orin Kerr, Counting Crimes when Defendants Possess Many Images of
Child Pornography on Several Devices, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 28, 2012, 2:18 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/25/counting-crimes-when-defendants-possess-many
-images-of-child-pornography-on-several-devices (discussing how the number of
crimes committed is counted differently under each of the two primary federal child
pornography possession statutes, and noting an Arizona state appellate court's
alternative method of counting each individual image as a separate crime under state
law).
2. See Child Exploitation & Obscenity Section, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/subjectareas/childporn.html (last visited
Aug. 23, 2013) (describing the ease with which producers, distributors, and
consumers of child pornography can now connect with one another and share
pornographic images via the Internet, thereby increasing the quantity of readily-
available child pornography); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
CHILD EXPLOITATION PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (Aug.
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/psc/docs/natstrategyreport.pdf ("The
anonymity afforded by the Internet makes the offenders more difficult to locate, and
makes them bolder in their actions."); see also Deb Shinder, What Makes Cybercrime
Law So Difficult To Enforce, TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 26, 2011, 12:05 PM),
http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/what-makes-cybercrime-laws-so-
difficult-to-enforce ("[D]iscover[ing] where-and who-the criminal is... is a
problem with online crime because there are so many ways to hide one's identity.
There are numerous services that will mask a user's IP address by routing traffic
through various servers, usually for a fee.").
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children can be digitally altered into sexually explicit images, and
computer-generated images can be made to look like child
pornography even though no real children were involved in their
creation.' Such imagery, deemed "virtual child pornography,"4 has
become the target of recent legislation.
Federal law criminalizes possession of virtual child pornography in
18 U.S.C. § 2252A, which targets offenses involving actual and virtual
child pornography.5 Section 2252A(a) (5) (B) prohibits the knowing
possession of "any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape,
computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child
pornography."6 Section 2252A is almost a mirror image of an older
statute that is still in effect and targets only actual child pornography:
§ 2252.' Section 2252(a) (4) (B) prohibits the knowing possession of
"1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other
matter which contain any visual depiction.., of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct."' The small wording change from "1 or
more" in § 2252 to "any" in § 2252A has had large consequences for
some defendants because courts have interpreted it to mean that the
"unit of prosecution" changed.9
A unit of prosecution is the unit of conduct, or the actus reus, that
the legislature intended to punish in the statutory provision defining
3. See Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A
Constitutional Question, 34 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 439, 440-41, 441 n.8 (1997) (describing
"morphing," a technique using technology to digitally create child pornography
from non-obscene images or from adult pornography); Kate Dugan, Note, Regulating
What's Not Real: Federal Regulation in the Aftermath ofAshcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
48 ST. LouIs U. LJ. 1063, 1064-65 (2004) (explaining several kinds of computer-
generated, virtual child pornography, including images that are produced with three-
dimensional modeling programs and are indistinguishable from actual child
pornography).
4. SeeAshcroftv. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002) (noting that then-
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (B) defined child pornography to encompass "a range of
depictions, sometimes called 'virtual child pornography,' which include computer-
generated images").
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2006). In addition to possession of virtual child
pornography, § 2252A also prohibits mailing, transporting, receiving, distributing,
reproducing, advertising, and selling child pornography, as well as possessing child
pornography with the intent to sell it. Id.
6. Id. § 2252A(a) (5) (B) (emphasis added).
7. Id. § 2252; see also Burke, supra note 3, at 442 (explaining that actual child
pornography depicts actual minors engaging in sexual activities).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4) (B) (emphasis added).
9. See United States v. Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that, unlike § 2252A's use of the word "any," the words "1 or more" in
§ 2252(a) reflect an intent to include multiple materials in a single prosecution);
United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 504-05 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that the
government must charge and prove separate receipts of pornography to sustain
separate possession counts under § 2252(a), but that simultaneous possession of
material in more than one storage device constitutes multiple counts under
§ 2252A).
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the crime."° Depending on how a court interprets a statute's unit of
prosecution, a defendant may be convicted of any number of counts
arising from the same criminal event. Take the following illustration
for example: If Congress crafted a statute prohibiting the sale of
child pornography such that the unit of prosecution was one image,
then a defendant could be charged with and convicted of a separate
count for each individual image sold in the course of a single
transaction. On the other hand, if Congress worded the statute such
that each transaction as a whole was criminalized, then a defendant
could only be convicted of one count per transaction, regardless of
how many images were sold in that transaction. Consequently, a
court's interpretation of the allowable unit of prosecution may lead
to a drastic difference in the number of counts a defendant receives
from a single incident.1
Courts have largely agreed that § 2252's unit of prosecution for
possession encompasses all of the storage devices possessed by an
individual at the same place and time, regardless of the number or
type. 12  Accordingly, in the hypothetical above, the defendant in
10. See Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky, Note, Counting Offenses, 58 DUKE L.J. 709, 712
(2009) (defining a "unit of prosecution" as the act that the legislature intended to be
the basis of a single conviction and sentence (citing, Brown v. State, 535 A.2d 485, 489
(Md. 1988)); see also Planck, 493 F.3d at 503 ('[W]e must first determine the
'allowable unit of prosecution', which is the actus reus of the defendant." (citations
omitted)).
11. Compare United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2009)
(holding that § 2252(a) only authorizes one possession count for simultaneously-
possessed child pornography such that defendant's multiple possession convictions
were erroneous), with United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2008)
(stating in dictum that the government may charge a defendant who has stored
images of child pornography in separate mediums "with separate counts [under
§ 2252 (a)] for each type of material or media possessed").
12. See United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 274 (1st Cir.) (holding that "the
plain language of section 2252(a) (4) (B) memorializes Congress's intent.., that one
who simultaneously possesses a multitude of forbidden images at a single time and in
a single place will have committed only a single offense"), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 589
(2012); Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 156 (holding that Congress did not intend to permit
separate prosecutions and convictions under § 2252 for each individual piece of
child pornography possessed); United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 729 n.5, 730
(5th Cir. 1995) (considering a former version of § 2252's possession provision and
holding that "the plain language of the statute's requirement that a defendant
possess 'three or more' items indicates that the legislature did not intend for [the]
statute to be used to charge multiple offenses"). But see Schales, 546 F.3d at 979
(stating in dictum that "where a defendant has stored sexually explicit images in
separate mediums, the government may constitutionally charge that defendant with
separate counts for each type of material or media possessed" but supporting the
proposition with Planck, 493 F.3d at 504, which interpreted § 2252A); United States v.
Hamilton, Civil No. 07-50054, 2007 WL 2903018, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 1, 2007)
(holding that Congress did not intend to limit charges for possession of child
pornography under § 2252 to a maximum of one count); United States v. Flyer, No.
CR 05-1049 TUC-FRZ, 2006 WL 2590459, at *4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 7, 2006) (finding "the
common usage of the phrase '1 or more' can not reasonably be interpreted to only
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possession of ten illicit images stored across one computer and two
drives could only be convicted of one count of possession under
§ 2252.
In contrast, courts interpreting § 2252A have concluded that the
switch to "any" indicates a singular unit of prosecution, such that
possessing multiple devices can lead to multiple possession counts. 3
Thus far, only two circuit courts of appeal have conclusively
addressed the issue of § 2252A's allowable unit of prosecution for
possession. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in United
States v. Planck,14 concluded that § 2252A permits a separate count of
possession for each type of storage medium containing child
pornography. 5  Accordingly, the court upheld the defendant's
conviction of three counts of possession: one each for illicit materials
stored on a desktop computer, on a laptop computer, and on a
number of diskettes. 6 Alternatively, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Hinkeldey,7 concluded that
§ 2252A's possession unit of prosecution is each physical storage
device.' Consequently, the court upheld the defendant's six counts of
allow a maximum of one count of possession, regardless of the number of visual
depictions of child pornography a defendant may have on various forms of physical
media"), rev'd, 633 F.3d 911, 913 n.1, 919-20 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding insufficient
evidence to support one of the counts of possession due to lack of any indication that
the defendant was in actual possession of the images cited in that count and
declining to address the issue of multiplicity because the reversal of one of the
possession counts mooted the defendant's multiplicity claim).
In Hamilton, the court relied on the reasoning of the Flyer court because the Eighth
Circuit, which had appellate jurisdiction, had not addressed whether § 2252 allowed
for more than one count of possession. See 2007 WL 2903018, at *1-3 (agreeing
expressly with the Flyer court's analysis that § 2252 does not limit the maximum
number of possession counts to one count). Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit cast
doubt on the decision of the Hamilton court, finding that "the phrase '1 or more' in
§ 2252 (a) (4) (B) arguably manifests a clear intention to include multiple materials in
a single unit of prosecution." Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d at 1014. Thus, the only three
decisions to find that more than one possession count can be brought under § 2252
have either been discredited or were based on a faulty premise.
13. See Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d at 1013 (finding Congress did not conclusively limit
the word "any" in § 2252A to permit only a single possession count); Planck, 493 F.3d
at 505 (holding that § 2252A permits multiple possession counts).
14. 493 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2007).
15. Id. at 504 (establishing that the government may charge a defendant who has
stored child pornography in separate types of media with multiple counts of
possession under § 2252A).
16. Id. at 505 ("Through different transactions, [the defendant] possessed child
pornography in three separate places... and, therefore, committed three separate
crimes. The counts are not multiplicitous.").
17. 626F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2010).
18. Id. at 1013 (affirming the district court's judgment that the six possession
counts, one each for six separate electronic storage devices, were not multiplicitous
because each device constituted a separate unit of prosecution).
1680 [Vol. 62:1675
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possession for one computer, one zip drive, and four computer
disks.19
The Planck and Hinkeldey decisions illustrate a slight circuit split
between the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. While both circuits agree that,
unlike under § 2252, defendants can be convicted of multiple
possession counts under § 2252A, they disagree on § 2252A's precise
unit of prosecution. To illustrate the practical difference between
the two circuits' definitions of § 2252A's possession unit of
prosecution, consider once again the hypothetical discussed above.
Under Planck's reasoning, the hypothetical defendant possessing ten
illicit images spread across three devices could be convicted of two
separate counts of possession: one count for storage on the desktop
computer, and one count for storage on the two external hard drives
(which would be grouped into one count because they constitute one
type of medium).2 Under Hinkeldey's reasoning, however, the
hypothetical defendant could be convicted of three counts of
possession-one count each for the computer, the first drive, and the
second drive-because all three are separate devices.2'
Charging defendants with, and convicting them of, multiple counts
arising from the same event or course of conduct can have significant
consequences. Prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding how to
charge defendants.22 Prior to trial, the mere presence of multiple
counts gives the prosecutor a greater ability to pressure a defendant
into taking a plea bargain favorable to the government because the
stakes of going to trial are higher.23 If the defendant does not accept
19. Id. at 1014.
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing Planck).
21. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing Hinkeldey).
22. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (establishing that a
prosecutor generally has complete discretion to decide whether to prosecute and
what charges to file against a defendant); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,
123-24 (1979) ("This Court has long recognized that when an act violates more than
one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does
not discriminate against any class of defendants. Whether to prosecute and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the
prosecutor's discretion." (citations omitted)). See generally Robert L. Misner,
Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 746 (1996)
(arguing that many state legislatures "have effectively abdicated public policy-making
to the prosecutor since it is the prosecutor, and not the legislature, that has the final
decision in determining which public policy, if any, is breached by an individual's
conduct"). Misner discusses prosecutorial discretion in state courts, but his
argument translates to the federal context where overlapping penal provisions make
it possible for a single act to be charged under more than one statute, thereby
creating power in prosecutors to decide which violations to bring against defendants.
Id. at 745-46.
23. See Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 737-38 (expressing concern with the
"enormous power" prosecutors have when they are able to charge multiple counts
for one act-a power that can be abused through the over-charging of defendants).
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a plea bargain and instead chooses a jury trial, the number of
charged counts can affect the jury's opinion of the defendant, 24 for
example, by amplifying the charged conduct. 25 Prosecutorial
discretion is particularly relevant to sentencing because the charges
brought determine the range of sentences a defendant can receive if
convicted.26 If a defendant is convicted of multiple counts, then the
court has discretion to order the sentence for each count to run
consecutively. 27 Alternatively, even if sentences run concurrently, the
existence of multiple convictions on a defendant's record can lead to
lengthier sentences for future convictions under recidivist statutes,
delays in parole eligibility, decreased credibility, and greater societal
stigma. 8
The repulsive nature of child pornography may lead one to believe
that the more counts a possessor can receive, the better.29 The Planck
24. Misner, supra note 22, at 748.
25. See id. (noting that the number of charges may influence a jury's view of the
defendant, which could mean a defendant facing many charges is at a disadvantage
in the eyes of the jury).
26. See id. at 742, 748 (describing the growth in the number of statutes carrying
mandatory minimum sentences and explaining that a prosecutor's decision to
charge a defendant with violating a statute that carries a mandatory minimum
penaltX limits the judge's ability to reduce the defendant's sentence below the
prescnbed minimum); see also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 1405 (9th ed. 2010) ("[T]he power of
the prosecutor to choose the charge upon which to proceed before a judge or jury
and to press for either harsh or lenient treatment is substantial."); Stephen L. Bacon,
Note, A Distinction Without a Difference: "Receipt" and "Possession" of Child Pornography
and the Double Jeopardy Problem, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1027, 1030-31 (2011) (illustrating
how a prosecutor's decision whether to charge a defendant with receipt or
possession has large consequences, as receipt carries a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years while possession carries no minimum sentence, and suggesting
that this punishment differential is illogical).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (2006) (providing that "[i]f multiple terms of
imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time,... the terms may run
concurrently or consecutively").
28. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 302 (1996) ("The second
conviction, whose concomitant sentence is served concurrently, does not evaporate
simply because of the concurrence of the sentence. The separate conviction, apart
from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that
may not be ignored." (quoting Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985)));
see also Misner, supra note 22, at 749 (listing several collateral consequences of
multiple-count convictions, including increased sentences for subsequent convictions
under sentencing enhancement statutes, adverse impact on a prisoner's ability to
obtain parole, adverse influence on society's perception of the defendant, and
adverse effect on the defendant's perception of him- or herself).
29. See Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography's Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REv. 847,
848-49 (2008) (expressing concern that some federal judges have reduced the
sentences of defendants convicted of multiple counts of child pornography
possession on the grounds that child pornography is a victimless crime); Holly H.
Krohel, Comment, Dangerous Discretion: Protecting Children by Amending the Federal Child
Pornography Statutes to Enforce Sentencing Enhancements and Prevent Noncustodial
Sentences, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623, 626-28, 675 (2011) (recommending that
Congress create a mandatory minimum sentence for possession of child
[Vol. 62:16751682
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and Hinkeldey approaches, however, are not the appropriate way to
accomplish this goal, nor is this goal necessarily desirable." Rather
than reach more just outcomes, both approaches will lead to
increased sentencing disparities between similarly situated
defendants. 1
Defendants possessing an identical collection of illicit images can
be convicted of a different number of counts, depending on whether
they are charged under § 2252 or § 2252A and on the number of
devices or media types they used to store their images.3 2 All other
sentencing factors being equal, these defendants may receive
drastically different sentence lengths based on the different number
of counts, and may suffer disproportionate secondary consequences
from having multiple convictions on their record. 3 Such disparity is
precisely what Congress sought to alleviate in the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 by creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission and
empowering it to promulgate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
("the Guidelines").?
pornography and incorporate the advisory sentence enhancements into statutes to
prevent judges from departing downwards from the sentencing guidelines). But see
Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade and Its Net-Widening Effect, 33
CARDozo L. Rzv. 1679, 1682-83 (2012) (ar in that policymakers have undertaken
an overinclusive "child pornography crusade" that takes an undifferentiated view of
all child pornography offenders as heinous child abusers, and asserting that passive
possession should not be grouped with production and solicitation offenses that
involve direct contact with minors).
30. See Hamilton, supra note 29 (explaining that the undifferentiated approach
treats all offenses equally despite the differing harm to children).
31. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21 (discussing the different outcomes
under the Hinkeldey and Planck approaches).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13 (demonstrating the difference in
counts that can be brought against a defendant based on the statute used and the
number and types of media involved).
33. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (listing examples of secondary
consequences of conviction on multiple counts).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006) states:
The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to...
establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice
system that.., provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors.
Id. (emphasis added); see also SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 26, at 1435 (explaining
the calls for increased consistency in federal sentencing practices that led Congress
to enact the Sentencing Reform Act).
The Guidelines seek to reduce discretion in federal sentencing and to make
sentencing more uniform. Id. at 1435. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
organizes federal criminal offenses into classes and designates a sentencing range for
each class. Id. Each offense starts with a base offense level determined by the
seriousness of the offense; the base offense level may be increased or decreased
based on a number of factors set forth in the Guidelines, such as the defendant's
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The purpose of this Comment is not to take sides on whether
individuals should receive harsher punishments for possession of
child pornography. Instead, this Comment argues only that the basis
for charging a defendant with counts of possession of child
pornography should not be determined by the number or type of
storage devices. Neither factor accurately indicates culpability and
neither factor is clearly expressed in the statute as Congress's
intended unit of prosecution. This Comment argues that the Planck
and Hinkeldey courts misinterpreted § 2252A's possession unit of
prosecution such that the additional possession counts in both cases
should have been dismissed as multiplicitous. Section 2252A's "any"
language should be interpreted as equivalent to § 2252's "1 or more"
language, and the unit of prosecution should not depend on the
number or types of physical storage devices. Thus, in the
hypothetical with which this Comment began, the defendant should
only receive one count of possession, regardless of how he arranged
the images across devices, and his sentence should be determined
based on the number of images possessed, along with the other
sentencing factors considered. 5
Part I provides a historical overview of federal child pornography
laws, including § 2252 and § 2252A, explains the problem of
criminal history. Id. at 1436.
When first enacted, the Guidelines and the sentencing ranges prescribed therein
were binding on sentencing courts. Id. at 1435. The Supreme Court, however,
struck down the provision of the Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005). Although the Guidelines are
now advisory rather than mandatory, courts are still required to calculate the
Guideline range for each defendant. See id. at 245-46 ("So modified, the [Reform
Act] ... requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, but it permits the
court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well." (citations
omitted)).
35. For a list of factors courts are advised to consider during sentencing, see 18
U.S.C § 3553(a) (2006) (held not mandatory by Booker, 543 U.S. 220). Section
3553(a) lists the following factors:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed-(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-(A) the
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines... ; (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide
restitution to any victims of the offense.
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multiplicity, and describes the test for multiplicity in the context of
identifying a statute's unit of prosecution. This Part also summarizes
United States v. Planck and United States v. Hinkeldey, as well as United
States v. Anson. Cases interpreting § 2252's possession unit of
prosecution are also addressed, as well as cases interpreting units of
prosecution in contexts other than possession of child pornography.
Finally, Part I briefly introduces relevant statutory canons of
construction for discerning Congress's intended unit of prosecution
for § 2252A.
Part II applies the pertinent canons of construction to analyze
§ 2252A's language, statutory scheme, and legislative history, and
argues that the possession provision is ambiguous as to the unit of
prosecution. This Part also argues that the rule of lenity should
apply, construing § 2252A's unit of prosecution for possession in the
defendant's favor. This application is contrary to how courts have
thus far interpreted the statute. Finally, this Part discusses the
purposes of punishment in our criminal justice system and explains
why these purposes are not better served by charging defendants
separately for each device or type of storage medium they possess.
This Comment concludes by arguing that the unit of prosecution
in § 2252A's possession provision should be interpreted to include
any number and type of storage devices that defendants possess at the
same place and time. Accordingly, defendants' sentences should be
determined by the number of images in their possession, along with
other advisory factors, as recommended by the Guidelines. 6
I. BACKGROUND
The following provides an overview of the history of federal child
pornography legislation, including the enactment of § 2252 and
§ 2252A, before launching into an explanation of multiplicity claims.
A discussion of how courts interpret possession units of prosecution
in the child pornography context under § 2252, as well as in other
contexts, follows. Finally, this Part provides a summary of the
decisions interpreting § 2252A's possession provision and introduces
the canons of statutory construction that make up the unit of
prosecution test.
36. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b) (7) (2012). This section
states:
If the offense involved-(A) at least 10 images, but fewer than 150, increase
by 2 levels; (B) at least 150 images, but fewer than 300, increase by 3 levels;
(C) at least 300 images, but fewer than 600, increase by 4 levels; and (D) 600
or more images, increase by 5 levels.
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A. History of Federal Child Pornography Laws, Including § 2252 and §
2252A
Federal legislation regarding child pornography began in earnest
with the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
1977."7 This Act, which prohibited the commercial production of
child pornography,38 was the first of several statutes passed over the
next three decades that expanded federal involvement in prosecuting
child pornography."9  While these statutes criminalized various
aspects of the child pornography industry, it was not until 1990 that
Congress added simple possession of child pornography to the other
offenses already listed in § 2252 by passing the Child Protection
Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990 (CPRPEA).4'
By the mid-nineties, Congress recognized the need to address the
effects of technology on the child pornography market. Section 2252
offenses require evidence that an actual minor was involved in the
creation of a given visual depiction.4' The rise of virtual child
pornography, however, has cast doubt on whether a real minor is
portrayed in a given image and thus impedes the government's ability
to prove this key element.4 2 The result of Congress's efforts was the
37. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978).
38. See Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of
Internet Child Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action, 11 APPALACHIANJ.L. 1,
11-12 (2011) (explaining that a late 1970s national media campaign in opposition to
the rise of the child pornography market "provided the impetus for [federal]
legislators to act" to prohibit the manufacture and commercial distribution of child
pornography).
39. See generally Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography
Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 545, 549-50
(2011) (tracing the history and enactment of four pieces of federal legislation that
expanded the reach of federal child pornography law: the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which targeted commercial production of
obscene images of children; the Child Protection Act of 1984, which deleted the
obscenity requirement in favor of criminalizing all actual child pornography; the
Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, which "specifically
prohibited the use of a computer to transport, distribute, or receive" images of actual
pornography; and the Crime Control Act of 1990, which established possession of
child pornography as a federal offense). Hamilton argues that the current Federal
Sentencing Guidelines do not sufficiently acknowledge the differing levels of
culpability that attach to the various child pornography offenses and, as a result, are
too severe on possession and receipt offenders. This has led to many federal judges
departing downward from the Guidelines, thereby increasing sentencing disparities.
Id. at 546-47.
40. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Star. 4816 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C § 2252
(1994)). The offenses included a prohibition on the knowing possession of "3 or
more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter" containing a
visual depiction of actual child pornography. § 323(a), 104 Stat. at 4818 (emphasis
added).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2006).
42. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing methods of creating
virtual child pornography).
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Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), which added
§ 2252A to the existing scheme of federal child pornography laws.43
Section 2252A, as originally enacted, was almost a mirror image of
§ 2252, except that it replaced the phrase "visual depiction . . .of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct"' with the phrase "child
pornography,"4 5 which was broadly defined to include various forms
of virtual child pornography.46
In 2002, the Supreme Court struck down key provisions of the
CPPA in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.47 Free Speech Coalition held that
the CPPA's definition of "child pornography" was overbroad and thus
infringed on First Amendment free speech rights.48 The CPPA
originally defined "child pornography" as
[A]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video,
picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture,
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other
means, of sexually explicit conduct, where... such visual depiction
is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.
49
In Free Speech Coalition, the Court found the "appears to be"
language overbroad because it encompassed a substantial amount of
non-obscene, lawful material, such as paintings and other works of art
or expression.5" Thus, in the interim between Free Speech Coalition and
Congress's subsequent amendment of § 2252A, a visual depiction
could not be constitutionally banned unless it depicted an actual
43. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4) (B) (2006).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (5) (B) (Supp. 1997).
46. Id. § 2256(8); see also infra text accompanying note 49 (quoting the original
definition of "child pornography" from § 2256(8)).
47. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). See generally Sue Ann Mota, The U.S. Supreme Court
Addresses the Child Pornography Prevention Act and Child Online Protection Act in Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition and Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 85, 88-93 (2002) (examining the CPPA and a circuit split over its
constitutionality that led the Supreme Court to consider and ultimately strike down
portions of the statute in Free Speech Coalition).
48. 535 U.S. at 256. The Court also struck down the CPPA's pandering provision
as facially overbroad because "[i]t prohibit[ed] possession of material described, or
pandered, as child pornography by someone earlier in the distribution chain"
because it banned depictions of sexually explicit conduct that were "advertised,
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the
impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct." Id. at 258.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000) (emphasis added), invalidated by Free Speech Coal.,
535 U.S. at 256.
50. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240, 241 (noting that pornography can
generally be banned only if it is obscene but that, under the broad CPPA definition,
even a Renaissance painting depicting classical mythology could constitute child
pornography).
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minor, its production involved the usage of an actual minor, or it was
deemed obscene by a court.
5
'
Without the broad definition of child pornography, § 2252A was
left as the functional equivalent of § 2252.52 Once the Court struck
the definition of "child pornography" from the CPPA, "child
pornography" was left undefined in this section. Following Free Speech
Coalition, the only way to construe § 2252A constitutionally, absent
further guidance from Congress, was to limit it to material that
depicted actual minors or obscene materials. 53 Thus, the virtual child
pornography loophole Congress set out to close in the CPPA was
again wide open.
Concerned that it would weaken prosecutors' abilities to convict
offenders,54 Congress responded quickly to the Court's ruling in Free
Speech Coalition with the passage of the Prosecutorial Remedies and
Other Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
(PROTECT Act).55 One of the main goals of the PROTECT Act was
to reestablish prohibitions on virtual child pornography that
conformed to the constitutional constraints laid out in Free Speech
Coalition.56 The Act accomplished this goal by redefining "child
51. See id. at 245 (explaining certain categories where speech can be limited).
52. See United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358, 364 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) ("By striking
down the overbroad portions of the child pornography definitions, the Court [in Free
Speech Coalition] made § § 2252 and 2252A indistinguishable.").
53. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 245-46 (establishing that the First
Amendment permits banning pornography that is obscene or that constitutes actual
child pornography).
54. See Henzey, supra note 38, at 22 (commenting that the Court's decision in Free
Speech Coalition was "almost universally criticized" and quoting the President and
Chief Executive Officer of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
who testified before the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security that Free Speech Coalition was "devastating for
America's children").
55. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. The findings for the Act stated:
The impact of the Free Speech Coalition decision on the Government's
ability to prosecute child pornography offenders is already evident. The
Ninth Circuit has seen a significant adverse effect on prosecutions since the
1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Free Speech Coalition.
After that decision, prosecutions generally have been brought in the Ninth
Circuit only in the most clear-cut cases in which the government can
specifically identify the child in the depiction or otherwise identify the origin
of the image. This is a fraction of meritorious child pornography cases. The
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children testified that, in light of
the Supreme Court's affirmation of the Ninth Circuit decision, prosecutors
in various parts of the country have expressed concern about the continued
viability of previously indicted cases as well as declined potentially
meritorious prosecutions.
§ 501(9), 117 Stat. 677.
56. See Henzey, supra note 38, at 23 (asserting that Congress passed, and
President Bush signed, the PROTECT Act in response to the "perceived legal
vacuum" created by Free Speech Coalition).
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pornography" in more precise language than its CPPA counterpart.
The PROTECT Act's definition of "child pornography," is "any visual
depiction . . . whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical,
or other means, of sexually explicit conduct."57  This definition
delineates three categories of visual depiction. The first category
comprises visual depictions that were produced using "a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct."58  The second category
includes digital, computer, and computer-generated images that are
of, or are "indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct."59 The final category consists of visual depictions
that have "been created, adapted, or modified to appear" like they
are of "an identifiable minor . . . engaging in sexually explicit
conduct."60 The "indistinguishable from" and "identifiable minor"
language is how Congress intended the new definition of "child
pornography" to pass constitutional muster after Free Speech
Coalition.6
In their current forms, the possession provisions of § 2252 and
§ 2252A are almost identical, but § 2252A applies to a greater amount
of material because the term "child pornography" therein applies to
both actual and virtual child pornography. Section 2252A prohibits
"knowingly possess[ing] . . . any book, magazine, periodical, film,
videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an
image of child pornography." 2 Section 2252 prohibits "knowingly
possess[ing] ... 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video
tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction," the
production of which involved "the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct."6" The wording change from "1 or more"
to "any" led the Planck and Hinkeldey courts to conclude that the unit
of prosecution changed from § 2252 to § 2252A, which in turn led
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006).
58. Id. § 2256(8) (A).
59. Id. § 2256(8) (B) (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 2256(8) (C) (emphasis added).
61. See 149 CONG. REc. 445-46 (2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (introducing
the PROTECT Act of 2003 and articulating that the Act is intended to "plug[] the
loophole," created by Free Speech Coalition, "where child pornographers can escape
prosecution by claiming that their sexually explicit material did not actually involve
real children"). Whether the new definition of child pornography is constitutional
has not yet been tested by the Supreme Court.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (5) (B) (emphasis added).
63. Id. § 2252(a) (4) (B) (emphasis added).
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both courts to reject the defendants' multiplicity claims and uphold
their multiple counts of possession.'
B. Multiplicitous Counts and Units of Prosecution
1. Multiplicity generally
"Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in more than one
count."65 When a defendant claims to have been charged with, or
convicted of, multiplicitous counts, the defendant is arguing that two
or more of the counts describe the same offense and are based on the
same conduct and that therefore, only one conviction should result.66
The danger of multiplicity is that it "may result in a defendant being
punished twice for the same crime or may unfairly suggest that more
than one crime has been committed. 67
There is a presumption against multiplicitous counts' rooted in
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment,69 which states
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put
64. See supra notes 9, 13-19 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of
the Hinkeldey and Planck courts in upholding multiple counts of possession under
§ 2252A).
65. United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 541 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting United
States v. De La Torre, 634 F.2d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also United States v.
Kerley, 544 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) ("An indictment is multiplicitous when it
charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law
and fact, only one crime has been committed." (quoting United States v. Chacko,
169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999))); United States v. Worthon, 315 F.3d 980, 983 (8th
Cir. 2003) (noting that multiplicitous charges are not necessarily improper in well-
pleaded indictments); IA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 142 (4th ed. 2008) (defining multiplicity as "charging a
single offense in several counts").
66. See United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 2007) (reporting that
the defendant appealed two of his three convictions for possession of child
pornography on the grounds that he was being prosecuted three times for the same
offense); Esch, 832 F.2d at 541-42 (rejecting the defendant's argument, on
multiplicity grounds, that her indictment on multiple counts of production of child
pornography was unconstitutional). See generally George C. Thomas III, A Unified
Theory of Multiple Punishment, 47 U. Prr. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1985) (noting the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishing a person more than once
for the same offense and discussing the Supreme Court's still-developing
jurisprudence regarding multiplicity).
67. United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833, 844 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted).
68. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955) ("[I]f Congress does not fix
the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be
reso ved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses ... "); United
States v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271, 278 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam)("[A]s a matter of
statutory construction, we are reluctant to turn[ ] a single transaction into multiple
offenses." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
69. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) ("The legislature remains free
under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once
the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the
same offense .. ").
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in jeopardy of life or limb."7 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects
defendants from successive prosecutions for the same offense after
either acquittal or conviction, as well as from multiple punishments
in the same proceeding for the same offense.7 The latter category
pertaining to multiple punishments has come to be known as
"multiplicity."72
The notion that double jeopardy encompasses multiple
punishments in the same prosecution, in addition to punishments in
successive prosecutions, dates back more than one hundred years. In
Ex parte Lange,73 the Supreme Court declared that "[t] he argument
seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the Constitution
was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice
punished for the same offense as from being twice tried for it."74
Therefore, under the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence, if a court determines that a defendant was convicted
of one offense multiple times in the same proceeding, the court must
vacate the multiplicitous convictions for violating double jeopardy.75
This requirement applies even if the defendant's sentence was not
increased by the multiplicitous conviction.76
70. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 ("The Double Jeopardy Clause 'protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense."' (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
17 (1969))); see also United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 729 (5th Cir. 1995)
(establishing that the rule against multiplicitous convictions stems from the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause); SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 26, at 1546
(explaining that the reach of the Double Jeopardy Clause is limited in instances of
multiple punishments because the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit legislatures
from imposing multiple punishments but, rather, prohibits prosecutors and courts from
imposing multiple punishments without express statutory authorization). But see
Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 739 (noting that, although the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense, "it is unclear whether or
how double jeopardy constrains prosecutors in defining an offense").
72. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing multiplicity); see also
BLACK's LAw DICrIoNARY 1112 (9th ed. 2009) (defining multiplicity as the "improper
charging of the same offense in more than one count of a single indictment or
information" and noting that multiplicity violates double jeopardy under the Fifth
Amendment).
73. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
74. Id. at 173.
75. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985) (declaring that the only
remedy for a finding that two convictions in the same proceeding-one for
possessing a firearm and the other for receiving that same firearm-were
multiplicitous was to remand to the district court to vacate one of the convictions);
United States v. Ehle, 640 F.3d 689, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that the "only
constitutionally sufficient remedy" where the defendant's counts for receiving and
possessing the same child pornography were found to be multiplicitous was to
remand to the district court and to vacate one of the convictions).
76. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 865 ("[T]he second conviction, even if it results in no
greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment."); see also supra note 28 and
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Multiplicity claims can arise two ways: (1) when a defendant is
charged for the same conduct under two different statutory
provisions; and (2) when a defendant is charged for the same
conduct under the same statutory provision.77 Only the second type
of multiplicity is relevant here because the primary issue addressed in
this Comment is whether a defendant can be charged with multiple
counts of possession under one statutory provision-§ 2252A.
2. Unit of prosecution test
The standard by which to evaluate a multiplicity claim differs
depending on which of the two types of multiplicity is at issue. The
test for the first type of multiplicity (involving two statutes), was
established in Blockburger v. United States.78 The Blockburger test
requires that each of the two violated statutory provisions include in
their respective definitions of the crime at least one element that the
other does not.79 If this test is satisfied, then the "two offenses are
sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative
punishment," and thus no multiplicity exists."0 If this test is not
satisfied, then the statutes either define the same offense or one
defines a lesser included offense of the other; either way, double
jeopardy permits only punishment."1 Although this test is only
applicable when the multiplicity claim involves the overlap of two
different statutes, some courts have incorrectly applied it to the
second type of multiplicity claim. 2
accompanying text (describing several collateral consequences for defendants of
being subject to concurrent sentences for multiple convictions).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 541 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that
the defendant's multiplicity claim arose when the government charged her for
successive acts of possession of child pornography as separate crimes under the same
statutory provision); United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1334-36 (9th Cir. 1981)
(differentiating between the government's arguments for reinstatement of three
counts dismissed by the district court where the first two arguments involved the
issue of multiple punishments under two different statutes and the third argument
involved the issue of multiple punishments under one statute).
78. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
79. Id. at 304.
80. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,166 (1977).
81. See, e.g., id. In Brown, the Court found that the Blockburger test was not
satisfied because only one of the offenses, auto theft, required proof of an element
that the other offense,joy riding, did not; all of the elements of the joy riding offense
were also elements of the auto theft offense. Id. at 167-68. Thus the Court held that
one of the counts was multiplicitous. Id. at 168.
82. See Thomas III, supra note 66, at 24 n.115 (listing state cases that apply the
Blockburger test to multiplicity claims based on violations of only one statute and
demonstrating how doing so can lead to bizarre results). The Blockburger test cannot
literally be applied when there is only one statute because then there are not two
statutes from which to compare elements. Id. "Not to be deterred by this logical
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When multiple counts are based on the same statutory provision-
the second type of multiplicity-courts must determine what unit of
prosecution the statute criminalizes.83 Determining a statute's unit of
prosecution requires ascertaining Congress's intent, which in turn
requires statutory construction.84 Such an inquiry is specific to each
statute and to the facts of the case.8" The Court has laid out three
general sources that courts should look to when interpreting the
congressional intent for a particular statutory offense's unit of
prosecution: the statutory language, the statutory scheme, and the
legislative history.86 If the intended unit of prosecution is still unclear
after applying these various canons of construction, then courts
generally apply the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in favor of
the defendant.87
For example, in In re Snow,88 the defendant was convicted of three
counts of violating a statute that stated "if any male person . . .
cohabits with more than one woman, he shall be deemed guilty of a
inconsistency," these courts have instead looked to see if each count is supported by
proof of a different fact. Id.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 447 (8th Cir. 2005) ("When
the same statutory violation is charged twice, the question is whether Congress
intended the facts underlying each count to make up a separate unit of
prosecution."); United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Bell
v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955)) (same). See generally Thomas III, supra
note 66, at 11-25 (summarizing the Supreme Court's unit of prosecution
jurisprudence).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 272-73 (1st Cir.) (noting
that "Congress's intent is paramount" in determining whether an indictment is
multiplicitous), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 589 (2012); Chipps, 410 F.3d at 448 (framing
the multiplicity question, which revolved around two convictions for simple assault,
in terms of congressional intent and looking at the statute's language (including
interpretive canons), scheme, and legislative history to ascertain this intent); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 711-12 (observing that in the "vast majority" of state
and federal offenses, the unit of prosecution is not specified by the statute so the
courts infer the allowable unit from sources that shed light on the legislature's
intent).
85. See United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952)
("What Congress has made the allowable unit of prosecution ... cannot be answered
merely by a literal reading of the penalizing sections. Generalities about statutory
construction help us little .... They do not solve the special difficulties in construing
a particular statute. The variables render every problem of statutory construction
unique.").
86. See Chipps, 410 F.3d at 448 (laying out the unit of prosecution test and
looking to all three sources of guidance to determine whether Congress intended
the statutory offense of simple assault to be a course-of-conduct offense or a separate-
act offense).
87. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955) (interpreting
congressional ambiguity on punishment for a federal offense in favor of lenity and
refusing to generate multiple offenses from a single transaction); see, e.g., Chipps, 410
F.3d at 449 ("We conclude that Congress has not specified the unit of prosecution
for simple assault with clarity, and so we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the
doubt in favor of [the defendant].").
88. 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
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misdemeanor. 8 9 The defendant had continuously lived with seven
women as his wives for a period of three years.9" Each count alleged a
violation of the statute during a roughly one-year period.91 In order
to uphold all three convictions, the Court had to determine whether
Congress intended the unit of prosecution for this statute to be
cohabitation during a one-year period.92 The Court found no
support for this interpretation of the statute, and held that the
temporal division of this continuous offense was "wholly arbitrary."93
Because the Court determined that the defendant had only
committed one offense, two of the three convictions were
multiplicitous.94 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial
court with instructions to grant a writ of habeas corpus for the
defendant.95
a. Three sources of guidance
When determining Congress's intended unit of prosecution, courts
apply methods of statutory interpretation. The starting point is
always an analysis of the actual language of the statute.96 After
applying common canons of statutory construction, some of which
are provided in greater detail below, if the language is still ambiguous
as to the allowable unit of prosecution, then courts typically look to
the statutory scheme97 and legislative history98 to discern Congress's
intent.
89. Id. at 275. Although each of the defendant's three convictions took place at
separate trials, the statute s unit of prosecution was the key issue; if Congress only
intended the defendant's actions to constitute a single offense, then the two
successive trials for that same offense violated double jeopardy. See generally id. at
281-85 (laying out prior authority supporting this conclusion).
90. Id. at 276.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 281-82 (describing the inconsistency of charging a continuous
offense as separate crimes based on temporal divisions).
93. Id. at 282.
94. Id. at 285.
95. Id. at 286-87.
96. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 697 (1995) (beginning the analysis by looking at the text of the statute when
interpreting the specific meaning of the term "harm," as used therein); United States
v. Kinsley, 618 F.2d 665, 668 (8th Cir. 1975) (examining first the plain meaning of a
statute prohibiting the possession of "any firearm" by a felon).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 158 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
no indication that the statutory structure of § 2252 implied that a defendant should
receive one count for each image of child pornography received in one transaction).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 542 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[Our]
conclusion is supported by the legislative history of the statute, which indicates that
Congress intended to protect children from the abuse inherent in the production of
pornographic materials."); United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510,
530-31 (E.D. Cal.) (analyzing the legislative history of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
including amendments and a Senate Report in order to glean guidance as to the
1694 [Vol. 62:1675
How MANY IS "ANY"?
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Universal C.L T.
Credit Corp.9 illustrates an application of the unit of prosecution test
where it was necessary to look to all three sources of statutory
interpretation. There, the Court addressed alleged violations of the
minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 193810 (FLSA)10 Under the FLSA's two
penal provisions, the defendant corporation was charged with thirty-
two counts: six for violating the minimum wage requirement, twenty
for violating the overtime provision, and six for failing to comply with
the record-keeping requirements.1"2 Each of these counts alleged a
breach of a statutory duty to one employee during a single
workweek." 3 The defendant argued, and the district court agreed,
that it could only be charged with one count for each of the three
violated provisions and that the other counts were multiplicitous.1°4
Because the question before the Court involved determining
whether the FLSA's penal provisions allowed for multiple counts
under the same statutory section (i.e., multiple counts for violating
the minimum wage requirement, multiple counts for violating the
overtime requirement, and multiple counts for violating the record-
keeping requirement), the second type of multiplicity was at issue
and the unit of prosecution test applied."0 ' The Court first looked to
both the language and statutory scheme of the two penal provisions.
The first penal provision made it "unlawful for any person . . . to
violate any of the provisions" of the sections describing the minimum
wage, overtime, and record-keeping requirements. 1 6 The second
provision fined "[a]ny person who willfully violates any of the
provisions of' the first penal provision. 7
The government argued that the unit of prosecution was each
employee because the FLSA expressly created a civil cause of action
for each employee to seek damages and restitution against an
statute's intended unit of prosecution), affd per curiam, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
But see United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358, 367-68 & 367 n.12 (5th Cir. 2002)
(applying the rule of lenity after determining that the statute's plain language was
ambiguous without considering legislative history).
99. 344 U.S. 218 (1952).
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
101. Universal C.L T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. at 218-19.
102. Id. at 219.
103. Id. at 220.
104. Id. at 220-21.
105. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the two multiplicity tests).
106. Universal C.LT. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. at 219 & n.1 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 215
(1952)).
107. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(a)).
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employer.1"8  The Court, however, reasoned that the statute's
language and scheme simultaneously supported and undermined this
interpretation.10 9 Because Congress expressly allowed civil liability on
a per-employee basis, it could have easily done the same for criminal
liability.10 Next, the Court turned to the FLSA's legislative history for
guidance."' When the bill from which the FLSA evolved was
introduced in Congress, it explicitly provided for separate criminal
offenses per employee for minimum wage and overtime violations,
and per week for record-keeping violations. 2 FLSA's final form,
however, contained no such provisions.1
The Court concluded that this legislative history, coupled with the
ambiguity of the language, weighed against the government's
definition of the unit of prosecution."' Agreeing with the lower
court, the Court decided that the penal provisions were intended to
criminalize a course of conduct as the unit of prosecution, rather
than a violation of a statutory duty toward an employee each week. l1 '
Consequently, the defendant could only be charged with one count
per course of conduct.1 6
b. Rule of Lenity
If Congress's intended unit of prosecution remains unclear after
exhausting the foregoing three sources of guidance, then the rule of
lenity applies and the court should construe the statute in the
defendant's favor.11 7 The rule of lenity is a judicially-created statutory
canon of construction defined as, " [t] he judicial doctrine holding
that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out
multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity
in favor of the more lenient punishment."1
108. Id. at 222.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 222-23.
113. Id. at 223.
114. See id. at 224 (concluding that the statute "cannot be said to be decisively
clear on its face one way or the other" and that "the history of this legislation and the
inexplicitness of its language weigh against the Government's construction").
115. Id.
116. Id. at225-26.
117. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955); see also United States v. Dauray,
215 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding a prior version of § 2252(a) (4) (B)
ambiguous and applying lenity to "resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor");
United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 666 (8th Cir. 1975) ("When Congress fails to
set the unit of prosecution with clarity, doubt as to congressional intent is resolved in
favor of lenity for the accused.").
118. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY, supra note 72, at 1449.
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The rule of lenity is founded on the principles that citizens should
have fair warning about which actions are prohibited by criminal
statutes, and that the legislature, rather than the courts, should
define criminal offenses and set the outer limits of punishment."' In
Universal C.LT. Credit Corp., the Court declared that when there is
more than one possible reading of a criminal statute, the Court will
not choose the harsher reading unless Congress has spoken in clear
and definitive language."'0  Additionally, the Court deemed it
inappropriate for the judiciary to "derive criminal outlawry from
some ambiguous implication." '
One of the oldest and most cited applications of the rule of lenity
to a unit of prosecution case occurred in Bell v. United States.'22
There, the defendant transported two women at the same time in the
same vehicle across state lines in violation of the Mann Act, which
prohibited "knowingly transport[ing] . . . any woman or girl for the
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral
purpose." 23 The defendant was charged with two counts of violating
this statute, one for each woman.'24 The Supreme Court reversed
and held that the defendant could only be charged with one count
because the statute was ambiguous as to whether the unit of
prosecution was each woman or each act of transportation and,
therefore, the rule of lenity dictated resolution in the defendant's
favor.'25 The Court famously declared that "[w]hen Congress has the
will it has no difficulty in expressing it,"126 meaning Congress could
have explicitly made the unit of prosecution an individual woman,
but it chose not to when it used the ambiguous word "any."
C. Interpreting Units of Prosecution
Courts have faced problems interpreting units of prosecution in a
variety of contexts. The following cases illustrate applications of the
unit of prosecution test to non-possession offenses, to firearms
possession offenses, and to child pornography possession offenses
under § 2252.
119. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (adopting a narrower
interpretation of the statute at issue).
120. 344 U.S. at 221-22.
121. Id. at 222.
122. 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
123. Id. at 82 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952)).
124. Id.
125. See id. at 82-83 ("When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing
to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.").
126. Id. at 83.
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1. Units of prosecution outside the possession context
At least two circuits have addressed the unit of prosecution for
receiving child pornography under § 2252, which criminalizes
"knowingly receiv[ing] . . . any visual depiction . . . of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct."127  In United States v.
Polouizzi,12 the defendant was charged with twelve counts of receipt
of child pornography129 for twelve images he received on four
different dates. 3 ° Although the defendant was not yet convicted of
receipt because the district court had ordered a new trial for the
receipt counts, 3' the circuit court advised on how the new trial
should proceed. 32 The court acknowledged that "the word 'any' . . .
'has typically been found ambiguous in connection with the allowable
unit of prosecution, for it contemplates the plural, rather than
specifying the singular.""3  Because "any" is ambiguous and there
was no readily discernible congressional intent or indication in the
statutory structure as to the unit of prosecution, "the rule of lenity
requires the conclusion that a person who receives multiple
prohibited images in a single transaction can only be charged with a
single violation of § 2252(a) (2). "134 Presumably, as a consequence of
this statement, the defendant could only be charged with four counts
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2) (2006) (emphasis added).
128. 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
129. The only difference between possession and receipt of child pornography is
the element of "possession" or "receipt." The other elements of both crimes are
identical when compared within § 2252 and within § 2252A. The "receipt" element
typically requires a prosecutor to prove how, when, and where a defendant obtained
child pornography. For possession, proof of how the defendant obtained the child
pornography is not necessary. Many courts, including the Courts of Appeals for the
Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, have concluded that possession is a lesser
included offense of receipt. United States v. Ehle, 640 F.3d 689, 698 (6th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366, 1374 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miller,
527 F.3d 54, 71-72 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 947 (9th
Cir. 2008). Prosecutors, however, may be able to circumvent a merging of the counts
by charging different dates for the receipt and possession counts or by charging the
defendant with receipt of certain images and possession of other images. Bacon,
supra note 26, at 1042, 1048; see, e.g., Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1375 (affirming convictions
because they were based on different items of child pornography). The main
consequence for defendants is that under both § 2252 and § 2252A, receipt carries a
minimum mandatory sentence of five years, while possession carries no minimum
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § § 2252(b), 2252A(b)(1)-(2).
130. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147.
131. See id. at 146 (noting that some of the jurors suggested that they would have
voted differently on the receipt counts had they known about the mandatory
minimum five-year sentence, and so the district court decided it had erred by
refusing to inform the jury of the mandatory minimum beforehand).
132. Id. at 157.
133. Id. at 155 (quoting United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1014 (2d Cir.
1991)).
134. Id. at 158.
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of receipt on remand because there was only evidence of receipt
transactions on four dates.
Similarly, United States v. Buchanan"3 5 involved a defendant charged
with four counts of receiving child pornography, one count per
image, for four images in violation of § 2252 (a) (2).1"6 The Buchanan
court emphasized that the burden was on the State to prove separate
receipts of the contraband if it wanted to charge the defendant with
multiple receipt counts.137 The State had failed to meet this burden
because it did not allege that the four images had been separately
received.'38 Additionally, none of the testimony at trial revealed that
the defendant had taken more than one physical action to receive the
images. 3 9  Thus, the court vacated the four convictions as
multiplicitous and instructed the district court to reinstate only one
count. 
140
The usage of "any"'141 also presented interpretation difficulties in
United States v. Corbin Farm Service,4 where the defendants were
charged with ten counts of violating section 703 of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act,143 which made it unlawful to "kill . . . any migratory
bird."1" The defendants made a single application of a pesticide to a
field, which caused the death of several birds protected by the Act.145
Each count charged the death of one bird,'46 but the defendants
135. 485 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2007).
136. Id. at 277-78.
137. Id. at 282.
138. Id.
139. Id. As the court explained, "[tihe differing times shown on the compact disc
to which some of the temporary internet files were copied did not establish that the
images had come from different webpages or that Buchanan had to take any action
other than navigating to a single webpage." Id. (footnote omitted).
140. Id. at 282-83.
141. Unit of prosecution ambiguities often arise when the statute uses the word
"any" in defining the offense. For example, in United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358
(5th Cir. 2002), the defendants were charged with forty-three counts of violating
§ 2252 (a) (2) which prohibits transporting "any visual depiction" of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct, and each count was based on one image. Id. at 363.
The court found this provision to be ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution and
applied the rule of lenity to hold that the defendants could only be charged with one
count per website instead. Id. at 367-68. Additionally, in Bell, the Supreme Court
found the statute prohibiting "knowingly transport[ing] ... any woman or girl for
[immoral purposes]" to be ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution. 349 U.S. 81, 82,
84 (1955); see also supra text accompanying notes 122-126 (summarizing the Court's
analysis in Bell and its holding that the defendant could not be charged with a
separate count for each woman simultaneously transported).
142. 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), affidpercuriam, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
143. Id. at 526 (referring to 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006)).
144. Id. at 527.
145. Id. at 514.
146. Id. at 526.
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argued that because they had only applied the pesticide one time,
they could only be charged with one count.
147
From the statute's language, the court found that the unit of
prosecution could be interpreted as either each act or each bird's
death.'48 The court turned to the legislative history of the Act and
rejected the government's argument that the unit of prosecution was
each bird, based on an amendment of section 703.149 Section 703 was
amended from prohibiting the killing of "any migratory bird" or "any
part, nest, or egg of any such bird(s)," to prohibiting the killing of
"any migratory bird" or "any part, nest, or egg of any such bird."150
The court explained that this switch from plural to singular did not
signify a change in the substantive meaning of the provision; rather,
Congress merely could have wanted the language of the provision to
conform to similar language in other parts of the Act.'51 After further
examining the legislative intent behind the Act, the court still found
the statute's usage of "any" unclear as to the allowable unit of
prosecution. Accordingly, it applied the rule of lenity, found that the
unit of prosecution was the act and not the number of birds killed,
and dismissed nine of the ten counts as multiplicitous.'52
2. Firearms possession units of prosecution
Units of prosecution for possession offenses can be particularly
difficult to determine because "possession" is a passive act that is not
easily broken up into discrete units. For federal firearms possession
statutes, courts have generally agreed that items acquired at separate
times or stored in separate places can constitute separate units of
prosecution, and therefore can support separate convictions.15 How
147. Id. at 527.
148. Id. at 530.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 529.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 531.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 256 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding
no multiplicity for firearms stored in two different cars because each car constituted
a separate storage place); United States v. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294, 298 (1st Cir.
1999) (finding no multiplicity for firearms stored in a barn and in a truck because
they were stored in separate places); United States v. Hutching, 75 F.3d 1453, 1460
(10th Cir. 1996) (finding no multiplicity for firearms stored in the defendant's
bedroom, car, and truck); United States v. Berry, 977 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding multiplicity where separate acquisitions or storage places were not shown);
United States v. Szalkiewicz, 944 F.2d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (finding
multiplicity); United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding
no multiplicity because separate counts were supported by separate acquisition
dates); cf United States v. Prestenbach, 230 F.3d 780, 783-84 (5th Cir. 2000)
("Possession of multiple pieces of stolen mail that were stolen at the same time gives
rise to only a single offense.").
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courts apply this "separate times or places" analysis, however, has
varied, even within the same circuit. Most courts require prosecutors
to show that different firearms were either acquired at different times
or stored in separate places. 15 4 At least one court, however, has stated
that storage in separate places is likely insufficient and, instead, the
prosecution must show that separate convictions are supported by
separate acquisitions. 155 Additionally, courts disagree on whether it is
sufficient for trial evidence to show acquisitions at different times or
storage in separate places, or whether the government must allege
these facts in the indictment and let the jury decide.156
In United States v. Kinsley,157 the Eighth Circuit conducted a full
analysis of one of the federal felon-in-possession statutes, which many
courts subsequently followed.'58 The Kinsley court attempted to
discern the allowable unit of prosecution from language prohibiting
a formerly-convicted felon from possessing "any firearm."'59  The
defendants were convicted of four counts of violating this statute for
154. See, e.g., United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 717, 721 (9th Cir. 1984)
(finding no multiplicity because the firearms underlying the counts were stored
separately in the defendant's car and bedroom closet); Wiga, 662 F.2d at 1336 ("The
general rule... is that only one offense is charged under [the statute] regardless of
the number of firearms involved, absent a showing that the firearms were stored or
acquired at different times and places." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); United
States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 1976) (same).
155. See United States v. McDowell, 210 F. App'x 574, 576 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006)
(declaring that the proposition "that separate storage-as opposed to acquisition of
firearms--can support separate felon-in-possession charges is dicta at best, as [ Wiga
and Szalkiewicz, the cases cited by the government,] turned on the question of
separate acquisition").
156. See Szalkiewicz, 944 F.2d at 654 (finding multiplicity because "the jury made no
finding of fact as to separate acquisition or possession"); United States v. Valentine,
706 F.2d 282, 294 (10th Cir. 1983) (overturning multiplicitous convictions where the
jury did not find-and was not asked to find-separate acquisitions, despite
"uncontroverted evidence" indicating weapons were delivered into the defendant's
possession at separate times); United States v. Bullock, 615 F.2d 1082, 1086-87 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that because the government did not
allege separate acquisitions in the indictment or attempt to prove separate
acquisitions at trial, the defendant's firearms possession counts were multiplicitous,
despite the fact that there was evidence in the record showing the defendant
acquired the firearms at different times).
157. 518 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1975).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[T]he
Eighth Circuit undertook a thorough analysis of the statutory language, the
legislative history, and the general statutory scheme relating to section 1202(a)....
We have nothing to add to the Eighth Circuit's painstaking analysis .. "); Bullock,
615 F.2d at 1084 (agreeing with the Kinsley court's "full analysis of the legislative
history and the statutory scheme" and its finding that the statute is ambiguous as to
the unit of prosecution, and noting that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits had followed
suit).
159. Kinsley, 518 F.2d at 666.
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simultaneously possessing four firearms."6  They argued that these
counts were multiplicitous and the court agreed. 6'
The court began with an overview of the unit of prosecution test
and stated:
Significantly, in many of the cases in which the courts have found a
Bell-type ambiguity, the object of the offense has been prefaced by
the word "any." Seemingly this is because "any" may be said to fully
encompass (i.e., not necessarily exclude any part of) plural activity,
and thus fails to unambiguously define the unit of prosecution in
singular terms.
162
Then, the court listed a number of cases dealing with a variety of
criminal statutes where the usage of "any" proved ambiguous as to
the unit of prosecution.163 After determining that the surrounding
language of the statute at issue did not clear up the ambiguity of
"any," the court turned to the legislative history and statutory scheme
for guidance." Neither source, however, provided any indication of
congressional intent, thus the court applied the rule of lenity and
held that the defendants could only be charged with one count for
the simultaneous possession of four firearms.1 65
Both the Kinsley and Corbin Farm Service courts also observed that
the fact that one act, or its consequence, is sufficient to support a
conviction does not mean that more than one such act or
consequence is sufficient to support more than one conviction. In
the context of possession, the Kinsley court noted that although
possession of a single firearm constituted a violation of the statute,
simultaneous possession of multiple firearms did not necessarily lead
to multiple violations.'66 The Corbin Farm Service court agreed, stating
that the Act "makes it clear that killing a single bird is sufficient to
create criminal liability; [but it] does not, however, indicate that
killing more than one bird constitutes more than one criminal
offense."'67 This observation is significant because if the opposite
were true, prosecutors could split up many crimes based on that logic
160. Id.
161. Id. at 666, 670.
162. Id. at 667.
163. See id. at 667-68 (naming cases interpreting "any woman or girl," "interfere
with any person," "harbors ... any prisoner," "any narcotic drug," "any of the
aforesaid drugs," and "any national-defense material").
164. Id. at 669-70.
165. See id. at 669 ("[T]he Supreme Court, in dealing with a different ambiguity
problem in [this statute], found general arguments as to the gravity of the evil
unavailing to prevent application of the Bell rule of lenity.").
166. Id.
167. 444 F. Supp. 510, 530 (E.D. Cal.), affd per curiam, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.
1978).
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and regularly convict defendants with many counts of violating the
same statute arising from the same conduct.168
3. Child pornography possession unit of prosecution under § 2252
Particularly relevant to this Comment are cases where courts have
interpreted the unit of prosecution for possessing child pornography
under § 2252A's sister statute, § 2252, because such interpretations
point out the key difference in the application of the two sections.
Courts have generally agreed with defendants who object to multiple
possession counts under § 2252.169 Most recently, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the issue of § 2252's
possession unit of prosecution in United States v. Chiaradio,17° where
the defendant was charged with two counts of possession for images
stored on a desktop computer in one room in his home and on a
laptop in another room.'71 The court declared one of the two counts
multiplicitous because the plain meaning of § 2252's "one or more"
language clearly indicated Congress's intent that simultaneous
possession of any number of images in the same place only
constitutes one offense. 1
72
In support of its conclusion, the court addressed the legislative
history of § 2252, particularly the fact that Congress had amended the
language from prohibiting possession of "three or more books,
magazines, . . . or other matter" containing an illicit visual depiction
of a minor to prohibiting "one or more books, magazines, . . . or
other [such] matter.' 17' This change, the court found, manifested
Congress's intent to penalize the possession of even a single visual
depiction; it did not indicate that "Congress intended to allow
prosecutors to divide simultaneous possession by a single individual
of several matters containing child pornography into multiple units
of prosecution."174 In so holding, the court rejected the
government's argument that the desktop and the laptop constituted
168. See Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 727-28 (finding "most unsatisfying" the
logic of Johnson v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 388 (Ky. 1923), where the court ruled
that, since a single hand of cards was sufficient to constitute a violation of an illegal
gambling statute, each hand of cards during one sitting could be charged as a
separate offense).
169. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that
defendants cannot be charged with more than one count of possession under § 2252
for materials simultaneously possessed in the same place, and calling into doubt the
precedential value of the handful of cases holding to the contrary).
170. 684 F.3d 265 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 589 (2012).
171. Id. at 272.
172. Id. at 274.
173. Id. at 273-74.
174. Id. at 274.
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different "places," or alternatively that the separate rooms constituted
separate "places," so as to support separate possession counts.15
In addition to § 2252's receipt unit of prosecution, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Polouizzi also addressed § 2252's
possession unit of prosecution. 176 There, the defendant argued that
his eleven counts of possession for eleven images and videos spread
across three external hard drives were multiplicitous.' 77 Because the
defendant raised this multiplicity claim for the first time on appeal,
the court only reviewed the claim for plain error. 7 1
The court found these counts were multiplicitous 79 because the
plain meaning of " [t] he language '1 or more' indicates that a person
commits one violation of the statute by possessing more than one
matter containing a visual depiction of child pornography."8 0 Like
the Chiaradio court, the Polouizzi court explained that the amendment
from "three or more" to "one or more" merely indicated Congress's
intent to punish the possession of even one item containing child
175. See id. at 275 ("The computers, while in separate rooms, were in the same
house and were programmed so that files could move freely between them. If a
defendant had multiple photo albums of images in his bedroom and living room and
periodically swapped images between them, two convictions-one for each
album--would not stand. This case, it seems to us, is the electronic equivalent of
that situation.").
176. 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
177. Id. at 148, 152. All eleven images and videos were different from the images
charged in the receipt counts. Id. at 159. The defendant argued that he could not
be convicted of both receipt and possession because possession was a lesser-included
offense of receipt so the Blockburger test was not met. Id. at 157-58. The court,
however, declined to decide whether possession is a lesser-included offense of
receipt, and instead found no double jeopardy violation based on the fact that the
receipt and possession counts were supported by different child pornography
materials. Id. at 159; see also supra note 129 (explaining how, in circuits that have
found possession of child pornography to be a lesser included offense of receipt,
prosecutors avoid double jeopardy violations by basing possession and receipt counts
on different images).
178. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 153-54; see also United States v. Lynn, 636 F.3d 1127,
1136 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Where, as here, a claim of a doublejeopardy violation was not
properly raised before the district court, we review for plain error." (citing United
States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 2008))), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 220
(2011). Under plain error review, the court will only reverse the district court'sjudgment if the error is plain, affects substantial rights, and "seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation ofjudicial proceedings." Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at
154; see also United States v. Gonzales, 339 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that
the error must be "clear under current law"); United States v. Thompson, 289 F.3d
524, 526 (8th Cir. 2002) ("To constitute a plain error, a district court's decision must
be (1) an error, (2) which is clear or obvious, and (3) which affects substantial
rights." (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-35 (1993))); FED. R. CRIM.
P. 52(b) ("A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though
it was not brought to the court's attention.").
179. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 156-57.
180. Id. at 155 (citation omitted).
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pornography; it did not indicate that Congress intended to allow
separate punishment for each image possessed.
1 81
Additionally, the court pointed to another provision in § 2252 that
provides an affirmative defense to possession. 182 This provision states
"[i]t shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating [§ 2252's
possession provision] that the defendant... possessed less than three
matters containing any [prohibited image]."' This defense
indicated that possessing two such matters only constitutes a (i.e.
one) charge.'84
D. Current Interpretations of § 2252A's Possession Unit of Prosecution
The foregoing discussion on multiplicity jurisprudence regarding
the interpretation of units of prosecution provides a foundation on
which to review the current opinions on § 2252A's possession unit of
prosecution. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits are the only federal
courts of appeals to have conclusively addressed this issue. While
these two circuit courts agree that, unlike under § 2252, a defendant
can be charged under § 2252A with multiple counts of possession,
the courts disagree on the exact allowable unit of prosecution.
1. Planck's unit of prosecution as each type of storage medium
a. Majority opinion
In United States v. Planck, a panel of the Fifth Circuit held that each
type of storage medium constituted a separate act of possession and
therefore a separate violation of § 2252A.185 The court upheld all
three counts of possession-one for a desktop, one for a laptop, and
one for a number of diskettes, all of which contained child
pornography.'86 The defendant claimed that two of the counts were
multiplicitous and should be dismissed because he was found in
possession of all three types of media at the same time and in the
same place (his home).8 7
181. Id. at 156.
182. Id. at 154.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1) (2006) (emphasis added).
184. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 155.
185. 493 F.3d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 2007).
186. See id. at 502 (stating that the desktop contained eighty-eight photographs
and videos of child pornography, the laptop contained four images, and the 223
diskettes had a combined number of images in the thousands, bringing the total
number of child pornography images to approximately five thousand).
187. Id. at 503.
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As support for his multiplicity claim, the defendant cited a previous
Fifth Circuit decision,188 United States v. Prestenbach.s9 In Prestenbach,
the court found that possessing four altered money orders inside one
container (a bottle) could only amount to one violation of a statute
that made it a crime to "[knowingly] possess[] ... any such false,
forged, altered, or counterfeited writing."19 The Prestenbach court
held that charging the defendant with a separate count for each
money order was multiplicitous because he possessed all of the
money orders at the same place and time, and the statute did not
expressly make each counterfeited writing a separate unit of
prosecution.' 9
The Planck court dismissed the defendant's reliance on Prestenbach,
however, based on dicta in that case suggesting that proving separate
acts leading to the possession of each money order may have
rendered the counts non-multiplicitous.'92 The Planck court found
this dicta applicable, presumably because the large quantity of images
in the defendant's possession allowed for the inference that at least
some of the images were acquired at separate times and thus by
separate acts. 9 ' Notably, the government did not actually prove or
allege separate acts leading to the possession of any of the images
stored in the three types of media.' Nevertheless, the Planck court
found Prestenbach inapplicable on the basis that there must have been
separate transactions leading to the defendant's possession.'95
The court then looked to its own case law interpreting a federal
firearms possession statute because such case law lent support to
Prestenbach's dicta that acquisition through separate transactions can
lead to separate possession counts. 196 The court noted three Fifth
Circuit decisions interpreting a statute prohibiting the possession or
receipt of "any firearm or ammunition." 97 The court found that
these cases stood for the proposition that the simultaneous possession
188. Id.
189. 230 F.3d 780, 783 (5th Cir. 2000).
190. Id. at 781 n.1, 784.
191. Id. at 784.
192. Planck, 493 F.3d at 504 (stating that "had 'the government proved separate
acts leading to... possession of the altered money orders, it [would be] ... a
different case'" (quoting Prestenbach, 230 F.3d at 784)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 506-07 (Wiener, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority's
conclusion that such a failure to introduce evidence was not fatal to the
government's prosecution).
195. Id. at 504-05 (majority opinion).
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (2006)) (citing United States v. Berry, 977
F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Bullock, 615 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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of firearms could support multiple counts of possession if the
firearms were "'received at different times or stored in separate
places."'1 ' Without explanation, the court took each type of storage
medium (the laptop, the desktop computer, and the diskettes) as a
"separate place" and upheld all the counts. 199
Although the cited firearms cases stated the different times or
different places requirements as alternative methods of supporting
multiple counts of possession, the court seemed to articulate the rule
for § 2252A's possession unit of prosecution such that the prohibited
items had to be both received at different times and stored in
separate places in order for multiple possession counts to stand. °0
The Planck court concluded that both prongs of this standard were
met because there were images stored on three separate types of
media and at least some of those images were presumably acquired at
different times.21' An underlying concern influencing the court was
that an alternative interpretation of the unit of prosecution could
allow "amassing a warehouse" of child pornography without
increasing the offender's liability from one count of possession.20 2
Almost as an afterthought, the court dismissed as inapplicable its
decision in Buchanan, which was decided only three months prior to
Planck.203 In Buchanan, the court struck down the defendant's four
counts, for four different images, of receiving child pornography
under § 2252 as multiplicitous. 2°4 In order to uphold separate counts
of receipt, the Buchanan court held that the government needed to
allege and prove that the four images had been acquired through
separate transactions. 25  The Planck court, however, distinguished
Buchanan because Buchanan dealt with the receipt provision of
§ 2252206 rather than the possession provision.20 7
198. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hodges, 628 F.2d at 352).
199. See id. at 502, 504 (stating only that each medium type was "capable of
independently storing images of child pornography").
200. See id. at 504 ("[W]here a defendant has images stored in separate materials
(as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A), such as a computer, a book, and a magazine, the
Government may charge multiple counts, each for the type of material or media
possessed, as long as the prohibited images were obtained through the result of
different transactions." (emphasis added)).
201. Id. at 505.
202. Id. at 504.
203. See id. at 505 (mentioning Buchanan in only one paragraph toward the end of
the court's analysis of multiplicitous convictions).
204. 485 F.3d 274, 276-78 (5th Cir. 2007).
205. Id. at 282.
206. See Planck, 493 F.3d at 504-05 (explaining the "receipt/distribution"
distinction rendering Buchanan inapposite). The receipt provision of § 2252
prohibits the knowing receipt of "any visual depiction" when "(A)the producing of
such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct.' 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2)
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b. Concurring opinion
In a special concurrence, Circuit Judge Wiener addressed the
multiplicity issue in greater detail. Judge Wiener stated that he
agreed with the majority's rule, yet he described the rule as only
requiring that the defendant either "(1) came into possession of
different items of contraband at different times or (2) . . . stored
some of the items in different places."2 °8 The majority, on the other,
seemed to conclude that both prongs must be met to support separate
possession convictions.2 9
Instead of focusing on the "different places" prong that the
government had relied on, Judge Wiener dismissed this prong as
"feckless" and focused on the first prong: whether the images were
acquired at different times.210 Judge Wiener strongly admonished the
prosecution for failing to allege, argue, or acquire evidence that the
defendant actually came into possession of the images at different
times.21' The majority and the concurrence simply assumed this
prong was met because, "[g] iven the overwhelming number of
images and movies stored on the computers and diskettes in [the
defendant's] house, it would exceed credulity to conclude that [he]
acquired, or could have acquired, all the images and movies at the
very same time."212 Judge Wiener counseled against such a blatant
disregard of circuit precedent regarding multiple counts of
contraband possession in the future.213
(2006) (emphasis added). The receipt provision of § 2252A prohibits the knowing
receipt of "any child pornography" or "any material that contains child
pornography." Id. § 2252A(a) (2) (emphasis added). Prosecutors have the discretion
to charge defendants with either receipt or possession of child pornography. See
Bacon, supra note 26, at 1030-31 (discussing the very different sentencing outcomes
for possession and receipt offenses under § 2252).
207. See Planck, 493 F.3d at 505 (explaining that whereas in Buchanan, "each
separate receipt of child pornography violates the statute," in Planck the actus reus is
possession, so the government must only prove that the defendant possessed the
child pornography "at a single place and time to establish a single act of possession").
208. Id. at 506 (Wiener, J., concurring).
209. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (stating that the majority
combined both prongs of the different time/different place test established in the
cited firearms cases).
210. Planck, 493 F.3d at 506 & n.1 (WienerJ., concurring).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 506.
213. See id. at 507 ("I am even more disturbed by the government's and probation
office's apparent failure to recognize the law in this circuit concerning multiple
possession offenses in general .... Here, the government either failed to determine
the applicable law before prosecuting [the defendant] or simply disregarded it.").
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2. Hinkeldey's Unit of Prosecution as Each Physical Storage Device
In the 2010 case United States v. Hinkeldey, the Eighth Circuit
became the second circuit to definitively address the unit of
prosecution of § 2252A's possession provision. The defendant was
charged with and convicted of six counts of possession in violation of
§ 2252A(a) (5) (B) for child pornography stored on a computer, a zip
drive, and four computer disks, all of which were found in the
defendant's home at the same time.214 The defendant appealed on
the grounds that the additional possession counts were
multiplicitous, 2 5 but the court upheld all six counts.
216
Rather than the de novo standard of review usually applied to
multiplicity claims,21 7 the court employed only a plain error review
because the defendant failed to raise the multiplicity issue before the
trial court. 18 Plain error review is a harder standard for a defendant
to meet as the appellate court will not disturb the trial court's
decision unless the error is plain enough that reasonable jurists
would not disagree on whether an error existed. 2 9  The court's
multiplicity analysis was brief. It first discussed Planck as case law
supporting the district court's decision. 220 Then, the court pointed
out that there was no case law specifically supporting the defendant's
214. United States v. Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d 1010, 1011 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that
an Iowa law enforcement officer obtained a warrant to search the defendant's home
after he traced child pornography files to the defendant's computer).
215. Id. at 1011.
216. See id. at 1014 (affirming the district court's judgment not to merge the six
counts of possession of child pornography).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2011)
(reviewing defendant's multiplicity claim de novo and concluding that "the use of
distinct websites to transport child pornography.., is not redundant for double
jeopardy purposes"), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2726 (2012); United States v. Planck, 493
F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 2007) (asserting that de novo standards are used for multiple
claims); United States v. Walker, 380 F.3d 391, 393 (8th Cir. 2004) (reviewing the
district court's finding de novo).
218. Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d at 1012. Recall that under plain error review, the court
will only reverse the district court's judgment if (1) the error is clear or obvious
under the current law, (2) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, and
(3) the error significantly affected the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the
proceeding. Supra note 178. Additionally, under plain error review, "the district
court's ruling will be upheld if the statute and case law do not provide a clear
answer." Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d at 1012-13.
219. Id. at 1014 (refusing to declare the defendant's counts multiplicitous because
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B)'s proper unit of prosecution "is, at a minimum, subject to
reasonable dispute").
220. Id. at 1013. The court also cited United States v. Anson (Anson I1), 304 F.
App'x 1 (2d Cir. 2008), modified after remand by 429 F. App'x 61 (2d Cir. 2011), as
support, Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d at 1015, but failed to mention that the multiplicity
language in Anson II holds little, if any, precedential value since the Second Circuit
subsequently remanded the issue to be reconsidered by the district court in light of a
new case in that circuit. See infra text accompanying notes 232-241 (summarizing the
complicated procedural history of the Anson cases).
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argument that § 2252A's possession provision is ambiguous.22 1 The
court noted that a previous Eighth Circuit case, United States v.
Martin,2 22 had implicitly allowed two child pornography possession
counts to stand.2  In Martin, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district
court's refusal to combine the defendant's two possession counts for
purposes of sentencing.2 24 However, no multiplicity claim was raised,
so the court did not consider the issue. The Martin court merely
noted that the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession
and stipulated to possessing more than one disk containing child
pornography; therefore, it was within the district court's discretion to
refuse to combine the counts for sentencing.2
25
Finally, without explanation, the Hinkeldey court rejected the claim
that "any" is ambiguous.2 6 The court reasoned that even if "any" was
ambiguous, a more lenient reading of the statute could punish a
defendant who possessed a significant number of images in the same
manner as a defendant who only possessed one image.227 The court
concluded that it was not "clear" or "obvious" that Congress intended
§ 2252A's unit of prosecution for possession to encompass multiple
storage devices. 22' Accordingly, the defendant failed to show plain
error and the six counts were upheld. 9
3. Anson V
In addition to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the Second Circuit
also briefly expressed an opinion on the issue of § 2252A's possession
unit of prosecution in United States v. Anson25 ° (Anson III). Given this
case's complicated procedural history, however, the Second Circuit's
opinion on the matter remains unclear. In United States v. Anson2
31
(Anson 1), the district court convicted the defendant of thirty-nine
counts of possession of child pornography for images found on his
221. See Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d at 1013-14 (asserting that even if the court accepted
the defendant's interpretation of the statute, for which there was no supporting
authority, there was still a strong argument that the court should reject a reading of
the statute in which possession of thousands of illicit images would result in the same
number of counts as possession of only one image).
222. 278 F. App'x 696 (8th Cir. 2008).
223. Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d at 1013-14.
224. Martin, 278 F. App'x at 697.
225. Id. (citing United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 503-05 (5th Cir. 2007)).
226. See Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d at 1014.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1013.
229. Id. at 1014.
230. 429 F. App'x 61 (2d Cir. 2011).
231. United States v. Anson (Anson 1), 04-CR-6180 CJS, 2007 WL 119150, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2007), affd in part, 304 F. App'x 1 (2d Cir. 2008), modified after
remand by 429 F. App'x 61 (2d Cir. 2011).
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computer and thirty-eight computer disks.232  The defendant
appealed his convictions to the Second Circuit in United States v.
Anson233 (Anson I1), where he argued that the possession counts were
multiplicitous.
234
The Second Circuit correctly framed the question as "whether the
facts underlying each count were intended by Congress to constitute
separate 'units' of prosecution. Then, without further
explanation, the court concluded that the language of the statute
lent itself to treating each storage device (e.g., each book, magazine,
etc.) as a separate unit of prosecution.236 The court affirmed the
defendant's multiple convictions, but remanded for the sole purpose
of allowing the district court to explain or reconsider why it ordered
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences." 7
On remand, the district court re-imposed the same sentences and
the defendant again appealed, this time because he was inadvertently
left without counsel at the second sentencing hearing.2 s The Second
Circuit remanded once again to correct this "oddity."2 39  On this
appeal, the defendant again raised a multiplicity claim, but this time
cited supporting language from Polouizzi, which the Second Circuit
decided after Anson I but before the defendant's re-sentencing
proceeding.24  While the circuit court did not decide the merits of
this claim, it instructed the district court to do so on remand.241
On remand for the second time in United States v. Anson 242 (Anson
V), the district court again dismissed the defendant's claim of
multiplicity.24 3 The court began by incorrectly framing the question
in terms of the Blockburger test,244 which only applies to multiplicity
232. Id. at *1, 3. Oddly, the court stated that the thirty-nine counts were for
violation of § 2252(a) (2), which does not prohibit possession, but rather prohibits
receipt and distribution. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2) (2006); see id. § 2252(a) (4) (B)
(criminalizing knowing possession).
233. 304 F. App'x 1 (2d Cir. 2008), modified after remand by 429 F. App'x 61 (2d Cir.
2011).
234. Id. at 3-4. This time the possession counts were correctly stated as violations
of§ 2252A(a) (5) (B) instead of§ 2252(a) (2). Id. at 4.
235. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 7.
238. Anson III, 429 Fed. App'x at 62-63.
239. See id. at 64 n.2 (describing the impact of the removal of the defendant's
attorney).
240. See id. at 64 (reciting the appellant's argument that there had been an
intervening "change in controlling law").
241. Id.
242. 04-CR-6180, 2012 WL 2873832 (W.D.N.Y.July 12, 2012).
243. Id. at *2-3.
244. Id. at *2 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)); see also
supra text accompanying notes 78-81 (explaining the Supreme Court's test for when
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claims involving charges for the same conduct under two different
statutory provisions, but then did not seem to actually apply this
test.245 Instead, the court addressed the defendant's claim in light of
the newly-decided Polouizz?46 case.2 47 The Anson IV court quoted
Polouizzi, a decision involving a multiplicity claim for child
pornography receipt counts, as stating that the usage of "any" was
ambiguous in terms of the unit of prosecution so the defendant
could only receive one receipt count per transaction, not one per
image as the defendant had been charged.2 48 The Anson IV court,
however, found the counts as not multiplicitous on the basis that
§ 2252A's language enumerating the various storage devices249
allowed the statute to avoid the ambiguity normally associated with
"any. 2 51 Consequently, the court affirmed the defendant's multiple
possession counts.
251
E. Relevant Canons of Construction
Interpreting any statutory offense's unit of prosecution is a matter
of statutory construction.252 The following are the most relevant
canons for the analysis of § 2252A's possession provision. When
interpreting statutory terms and provisions, discussion of a statute's
language is often intertwined with discussion of the overall statutory
scheme. For the sake of clarity, however, these two sources of
guidance are separated here.
1. Plain meaning and analogous statutes
The first step in any exercise of statutory interpretation should
always be looking to the plain meaning of the text itself.25 3 The plain
a multiplicity claim arises out of the overlap of two separate statutory provisions,
which requires a determination of whether each provision requires an additional
element that the other does not).
245. See Anson IV, 2012 WL 2873832, at *2 (applying the rule of lenity over the test
established in Blockburger).
246. United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 155 (2d Cir. 2009). For a greater
discussion of Polouizzi, see supra text accompanying notes 128-134 (receipt counts)
and 176-184 (possession counts).
247. See Anson I, 2012 WL 2873832, at *2 (rejecting the defendant's reliance on
Polouizzi).
248. Id. (quoting Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 155) (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. See supra text accompanying note 62 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2006)).
250. Id. at *3.
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (introducing the unit of
prosecution test for multiplicity arising from the same statutory provision).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Vig, 167 F.3d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1999) ("In
determining the meaning of the phrase 'other matter' as it is used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252 (a) (4) (B), our starting point must be the plain language of the statute.... In
such cases, we look to the ordinary, commonsense meaning of the words."); see also
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meaning canon asks what the statutory language ordinarily means to
a typical speaker of the language.2 54 Courts may utilize dictionaries as
a source of guidance on a word's plain meaning.255 When the plain
meaning of a statutory term is not clear on its face, courts may look to
judicial interpretations of that term in similar statutes as well.256
2. Avoiding absurd results
In addition to referencing plain meaning and analogous case law,
courts try to avoid interpretations of statutory provisions that would
result in absurd outcomes.257 The canon of avoiding absurdity
expresses the presumption that Congress does not intend to pass
absurd or irrational legislation.25
The Supreme Court applied this canon to a unit of prosecution
issue in Ladner v. United States.259 In Ladner, the Court was tasked with
interpreting the allowable unit of prosecution in a statute prohibiting
the assault of "any" federal officer.2" The defendant had fired a
shotgun once into the front seat of a vehicle where two federal
officers were sitting.261 The pellets from the shot wounded both of
the officers and the defendant was convicted of two counts of
assault. 2
6 2
Relying on the canon of avoiding absurdity, the Court deemed one
of the two counts multiplicitous.263 As an example of an absurd
outcome that would result from convicting a defendant with one
count per officer, the Court described a hypothetical defendant who
merely points a gun at five officers but doesn't fire.2' This defendant
could be charged with five counts and given consecutive ten-year
sentences for each count, leading to fifty years imprisonment when
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) ("Our first step in interpreting a
statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.").
254. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 257 (2d ed. 2006).
255. Id.
256. See id. at 291-92 (reasoning that when a legislature borrows terminology from
another statute, it is presumed to know the judicial interpretation of the statute from
which it is borrowing from).
257. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388
(2003) ("From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has subscribed
to the idea that judges may deviate from even the clearest statutory text when a given
application would otherwise produce 'absurd' results.").
258. ESKRIDGE,JR. ETAL., supra note 254, at 267.
259. 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
260. Id. at 173.
261. Id. at 171.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 177, 178.
264. Id. at 177.
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no officer was even injured. 65 Yet another hypothetical defendant
who actually shoots and harms or even kills an officer could only
receive one count, and thus only a single ten-year sentence. 6  The
Court reasoned that such an interpretation of the unit of prosecution
would lead to penalties "totally disproportionate" to the culpability of
a defendant because the number of officers affected by one act often
will not bear much relation to the magnitude of the harm caused and
thus to the seriousness of the crime.267
3. Constitutional avoidance
When dealing with alleged multiplicitous counts, another
important canon of construction to consider is the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, which provides that courts should only
decide constitutional issues when it is essential to do so. 268 Referring
to this doctrine, Justice Brandeis explained that "if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction or general
law, the Court will decide only the latter."26" Elaborating, he stated,
"'[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided.'2 7°  This doctrine is premised upon a respect for
Congress in that it presumes the legislature does not intend to pass
unconstitutional laws and seeks to reduce "friction" that may result
from the judiciary striking down an act of Congress.27'
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343
(1999) ("If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of
constitutionality.., unless such adjudication is unavoidable." (quoting Spector
Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (" [W]here
an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."); see also ESKRIDGE,JR. ET
AL., supra note 254, at 360 (describing this canon as a "fundamental principle of
American public law").
269. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
270. Id. at 348 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
271. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (suggesting
that the constitutional avoidance canon seeks "to minimize disagreement between
the branches by preserving congressional enactments that might otherwise founder
on constitutional objections"); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.
502, 566 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (proposing that "[t]he doctrine assumes
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NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago272 illustrates an application of the
constitutional avoidance doctrine by the Supreme Court. Prior to
this case, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) interpreted its
jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act 275 (NLRA) such
that it had jurisdiction over schools that were "religiously associated"
but not "completely religious" because they taught secular subjects in
addition to religious ones .1 4  The Court, however, rejected this
interpretation and construed the NLRA as precluding the NLRB's
jurisdiction over religiously associated schools.275
After first determining that neither the statute's language nor
legislative history affirmatively permitted the NLRB jurisdiction over
religiously associated schools,276 the Court turned to the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance. The Court noted that, if it was to agree
with the NLRB's interpretation of its own jurisdiction, then the Court
would have to decide whether that jurisdiction infringed upon the
First Amendment's free exercise and establishment rights of those
schools. 7 7 The Court refused to construe the NLRA in such a way
because it would necessarily implicate the Religion Clauses, raising a
serious risk that those clauses would be violated.278 Absent clear and
affirmative congressional intent to extend the NLRB's jurisdiction to
religiously associated schools,2 79 the Court would not resolve such a
difficult and sensitive First Amendment question.280 Finding no such
expression from Congress, the Court construed the statute so as to
preclude the NLRB's jurisdiction over these schools.281
4. Whole act rule
In addition to the text of the statute and substantive canons such as
absurdity and constitutional avoidance, the overall statutory scheme
can shed light on an ambiguous provision. In applying the whole act
rule, courts may refer to other provisions in the same statute, as well
as to other statutes that are part of the same legislative scheme.282
Congress would prefer a less-than-optimal interpretation of its statute" to the risk of
the statute being set aside entirely as unconstitutional (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523
U.S. at 237-38)).
272. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
273. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
274. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S at 492-93.
275. Id. at 507.
276. Id. at 504.
277. Id. at 499.
278. Id. at 507.
279. Id. at 504.
280. Id. at 507.
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484
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The "whole act rule" looks at how well different possible
interpretations of an ambiguous term or provision fit within the
statute or the code as a whole.28 ' This rule "presume [s] that Congress
uses terms consistently, intends that each provision add something to
the statutory scheme, and does not want one provision to be applied
in ways that undercut other provisions. "284 This presumption,
however, does not always align with reality, as terms may be "inserted
willy-nilly into the law" for various reasons, including simple
oversight.285 Further supporting this canon, the Supreme Court has
stated that "[s] tatutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor" and a
"provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by
the remainder of the statutory scheme."286
II. THE POSSESSION UNIT OF PROSECUTION FOR § 2252A SHOULD BE
INTERPRETED TO ENCOMPASS ALL ITEMS POSSESSED AT THE SAME
PLACE AND TIME
After identifying the appropriate manner for interpreting the unit
of prosecution of a criminal offense, and pinpointing relevant canons
of construction, the reasoning-or lack thereof-behind the Planck,
Hinkeldey, and Anson IV decisions can be addressed. All three courts
stopped their analysis at the first step of looking to the statutory
language, and concluded without much explanation that the
language was unambiguous. The following sections elaborate on the
analysis that these three courts should have followed in interpreting
§ 2252A by looking more critically at the relevant statutory language
and various canons for construing that language, the statutory
scheme, and the legislative history. Such analysis leads to the
conclusion that the rule of lenity should have applied in all three
cases, and the defendants should only have been convicted of one
count of possession.
A. Interpreting the Statutory Language of § 2252A(a)(5)(B)
1. Plain meaning
The text defining child pornography possession under § 2252A
prohibits the knowing possession of "any book, magazine, periodical,
film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an
U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (determining the meaning of a specific term in one section of
the Bankruptcy Code by analyzing its use in other sections of the Code).
283. ESKRIDGE,JR. ETAL., supra note 254, at 257.
284. Id. at 271.
285. Id.
286. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex., at 371.
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image of child pornography." s2 7  The plain meaning of "any" is
ambiguous because it can be used to refer to items in the singular or
items in the plural, unless its context clarifies its meaning. The
Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "any" as "one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind," "one, some, or all indiscriminately
of whatever quantity," or "unmeasured or unlimited in amount,
number or extent. "21s  Similarly, the American Heritage Dictionary
defines "any" to mean "[o]ne, some, every, or all without
specification," and "[a]ny one or more persons, things, or
quantities. "289
Many courts have recognized the numerical ambiguity of "any" in
unit of prosecution cases. 29" The Eighth Circuit, in Kinsley, stated that
"any" "fails to unambiguously define the unit of prosecution in
singular terms."291 Likewise, in Prestenbach, the Fifth Circuit addressed
the ambiguity of "any" and noted that it can mean either "one" or
"some."2912 For further guidance on the plain meaning of "any," the
Prestenbach court looked to a dictionary and found "any" defined as
"one, a, an, or some; one or more without specification or
identification. "293
Such a discussion of the plain meaning of § 2252A's language, and
more specifically the meaning of "any," is glaringly missing from both
the Plance94 and Hinkeldey295 opinions. Dictionaries and a substantial
amount of case law all acknowledge that "any" is numerically
ambiguous, which causes particular problems when trying to identify
a statute's allowable unit of prosecution. 296  Given this lack of an
287. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (5) (b) (2006) (emphasis added).
288. Any Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTERNEWWORLD DIGnONARY, http://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/any (last visited Aug. 23, 2013).
289. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 81 (4th ed. 2000).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1014 (2d Cir. 1991) ("In cases
in this and other circuits, the word 'any' has 'typically been found ambiguous in
connection with the allowable unit of prosecution,' for it contemplates the plural,
rather than specifying the singular." (quoting United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665,
668 (8th Cir. 1975))); see also supra note 163 (listing examples of phrases from a
variety of criminal statutes where the usage of "any" proved ambiguous as to the
allowable unit of prosecution).
291. 518 F.2d 665, 667 (8th Cir. 1975).
292. 230 F.3d 780, 783 (5th Cir. 2000).
293. Id. at 783 n.14 (citing RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (rev. ed. 1982)).
294. See 493 F.3d 501, 503-04 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing Prestenbach and firearms
possession cases, but not the meaning of "any").
295. See 626 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2010) (failing to respond to the defendant's
reliance on Kinsley's statement that "any" is ambiguous with regard to the unit of
prosecution, and instead relying on the lack of clear case law to uphold the
defendant's convictions under plain error review).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 288-289 (describing several dictionary
definitions of the word "any").
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obvious plain meaning, both the Planck and Hinkeldey courts should
have acknowledged the ambiguity and explained why it was not
problematic for the statute.
The Anson IV court, on the other hand, acknowledged the
ambiguous nature of "any," but decided that the rest of the
provision's language, which lists different containment objects,
clarified that the unit of prosecution is each physical device.2 97 The
enumeration of various storage devices, however, does not support
Anson TVs interpretation as clearly as the court suggested. Congress
could simply have intended that each image not be a separate unit of
prosecution. After all, § 2252's possession provision also lists these
storage devices 298 yet courts have held that its unit of prosecution is
not each device, but rather all images on all devices possessed at the
same place and time.299 Since the plain meaning of § 2252A's
possession provision is unclear, the next step should have been
looking to other canons of construction.00
2. Possession units of prosecution in analogous contexts
Only Planck fully employed the analogous contexts canon of
construction by looking to case law interpreting "any" in federal
firearms possession statutes. As the concurrence in Planck noted, a
case involving possession of child pornography charges is a
contraband possession case at its heart. 0'° This is likely why the Planck
majority turned to cases interpreting firearms possession statutes for
guidance.0 2 These cases generally stated that if different firearms
were acquired at different times or stored in separate places, then
multiple counts of possession could stand.03
297. Anson IV, 04-CR-6180, 2012 WL 2873832, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012).
298. Section 2252 prohibits the knowing possession of one or more "books,
magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a) (4) (B) (2006).
299. See, e.g., United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 274 (1st Cir.) (finding
§ 2252 clear and unambiguous on its face), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 589 (2012); United
States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 155 (2d Cir. 2009) (same).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 257-286 (describing the statutory
interpretation process when the plain meaning is unclear).
301. United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 507 (5th Cir. 2007) (Wiener, J.,
concurring).
302. See id. at 503-04 (majority opinion) (looking to analogous precedent
interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) to mean that defendants could be charged with
multiple firearm possession counts if different firearms were obtained at different
times or stored in separate places).
303. See id. at 504 (discussing the conclusions reached in United States v. Berry,
977 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1992), United States v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 350, 352 (5th
Cir. 1980), and United States v. Bullock, 615 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1980)); see
also supra notes 157-164 and accompanying text (summarizing Kinsley's much-cited
holding that the federal firearms possession statute at issue was ambiguous as to the
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The Planck court interpreted each type of storage medium as a
different "place," without explaining its reason for doing so.3 °4 The
court implicitly analogized the different types of storage media to
separate places where firearms could be stored."' The Hinkeldey
court also impliedly followed this reasoning, except it analogized
each physical storage device to a separate "place."30 6 Neither analogy
works, however, because each storage device is essentially a container
for the digital prohibited images. It is unlikely that the firearms cases
cited in Planck would have upheld multiple counts of possession if the
defendant in each had stored groups of firearms in separate
containers around the same residence.
Indeed, some courts have expressly rejected the idea that separate
rooms, let alone separate containers, can constitute separate "places"
for purposes of defining possession offenses.0 7 The same circuit that
decided Planck also decided a prior firearms possession case that
Planck did not mention: United States v. McCrary. ° In that case, the
court disallowed separate sentences for weapons stored in a trailer
home and in an outbuilding that was utilized by the trailer's residents
as an extension of their home.0 9 The court declared it "untenable"
to hold that items stored in the same home in different rooms could
support separate possession charges based on being stored in
different "places," even if the rooms were physically separated."' 0
The First Circuit agreed in Chiaradio and explicitly rejected the
view that two different computers (one a desktop and one a laptop)
allowable unit of prosecution, as well as similar cases from other circuits interpreting
federal firearms possession statutes).
304. See Planck, 493 F.3d at 504-05 (upholding one count of possession for the
desktop, one count for the laptop, and one count for all of the diskettes because they
constituted different types of media).
305. See id. at 504 (emphasizing that the three types of storage media utilized by
the defendant were "each capable of independenly storing images").
306. See United States v. Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing
Planck as support for the district court's judgment, but upholding separate counts for
the same type of storage medium (disks)).
307. See, e.g., United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 273-75 (1st Cir.)
(discrediting the argument that two separate electronic storage media in two
separate rooms could constitute two different "places" when they were in the same
house), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 589 (2012); United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323,
327-28 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that two rooms that were not technically in the same
building still constituted one "place" for purposes of the possession counts).
308. 643 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1981).
309. See id. at 327-28 ("It is true that some of the firearms were found in an
outbuilding employed by appellant as a storage/laundry facility while the remaining
weapons were discovered in the bedroom of the trailer .... The outbuilding was for
all practical purposes a part of the residential dwelling.... [It] constituted an
integral part of the dwelling unit. It was constructed upon the same residential lot
and was used for ordinary household purposes, i.e., as a storage and laundry room.").
310. Id.
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in the same home, or the two different rooms where the computers
were located, could constitute different "places" for purposes of
counting possession offenses under § 2252.11 Even the Planck
concurrence harshly condemned the idea that different types of
storage devices can constitute different places. 12 Therefore, the
Planck and Hinkeldey courts' conclusions that each storage device or
type of medium constitutes a separate "place" is not supported by the
analogous case law across the circuits." 3
Setting the unit of prosecution as the type of storage medium, as
did the Planck court, is arguably more problematic than setting the
unit of prosecution as each individual device. What makes the type of
device more analogous to a separate "place" than each storage device
itself? The only inferable explanation from Planck is that the court
did not want to invite future prosecutions to charge defendants with
one count for each device because the number of counts could
quickly get out of hand. The defendant in Planck, for instance,
possessed 223 diskettes containing child pornography. 4 The court
was unable to point to a single reference that supported its holding
that Congress's intended unit of prosecution for possession was the
type of storage device. 15
Interpreting § 2252A's possession unit of prosecution as each type
of medium creates the additional problem of determining what
constitutes different media types. It is unclear what led the Planck
court to determine that a desktop computer constituted a different
311. See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275 ("[The government] has consistently argued
the significance of dual computers in separate rooms. We find this supposed
distinction unconvincing. The computers, while in separate rooms, were in the same
house....").
312. See United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 506 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (Wiener, J.,
concurring) ("Although the desktop computer was found in [the defendant's] living
room, the laptop computer in his dining room, and the diskettes in his bedroom, all
were stored in his house at the same time. Under these facts, it is feckless to contend
that these items were stored in different places. Possession of all items within [the
defendant's] home was storage in the same place." (emphasis added)).
313. Additionally, the court in Anson V is not clear as to its basis for upholding
the defendant's thirty-nine possession counts for thirty-nine disks. It states that "each
pornographic image possessed could constitute a separate 'unit' of prosecution." 04-
CR-6180, 2012 WL 2873832, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012). But it also pointed out
the enumeration of physical storage devices in § 2252A and stated that this
enumeration avoids the ambiguity associated with "any," id., which could mean that
separate images can only support separate possession counts when they are stored on
different physical devices (as the Hinkeldey court concluded).
314. See 493 F.3d at 502 (recounting the results of the government's search that
found over 5,000 images contained on a laptop computer, a desktop computer, the
diskettes, and other still photographs).
315. See id. at 503-05 (asserting that the matter is one of first impression and
exploring precedent in analogous cases, but failing to identify a case sufficiently
similar to the present circumstances).
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type of storage medium than a laptop computer. As the Chiaradio
court pointed out, computers can easily be set up to allow the free
transfer of files between them.316 If files can freely move between the
two computers, it is an arbitrary distinction to consider each
computer a different type of medium merely because one is
stationary and the other portable.
While the firearms possession cases hold that storage in separate
places can support separate possession offenses, they also hold that
acquiring possession of different items at different times is an
independent method of establishing separate possession counts.' 7
The Planck majority seemed to hold that both of these factors must be
(and were) met.3 1 8 Planck's concurrence clearly stated that only one
of these two factors needed to be met to support separate possession
offenses, and in that case, the second factor was met.3" 9 The Hinkeldey
court did not decide whether separate acquisitions must be proven in
addition to separate storages; instead it held only that the district
court's failure to require separate acquisitions did not constitute
plain error.320  Anson IV did not address the separate acquisitions
theory.32'
Both the Planck court (majority and concurrence) and the
Hinkeldey court missed a key factor in relying on separate acquisitions
to support separate possession counts in those cases: actual evidence
that there were at least as many separate acquisitions of illicit
materials as there were possession convictions. In the firearms
possession cases where multiple possession counts were upheld based
on separate acquisitions of different firearms, the government
316. See 684 F.3d at 275 (noting that the desktop and laptop at issue were
"programmed so that files could move freely between them").
317. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 977 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1992) (vacating
defendant's sentences as multiplicitous because the government had failed to
produce evidence that he had obtained the firearms at different times); United
States v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that it is "well-
established" that simultaneous possession of more than one firearm only warrants
one punishment, "unless they were received at different times" (emphasis added)).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 200-201 and accompanying text (quoting
the Planck majority as stating that defendants can be convicted of separate possession
counts for separate types of media "as long as the prohibited images were obtained
through the result of different transactions" (emphasis added)).
319. See 493 F.3d at 506 (Wiener, J., concurring) (stating the possession test in
either/or terms).
320. 626 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2010) ("This court has not addressed this
'different transactions' standard, but even assuming that it is clearly dictated by the
statute, the district court's refusal to merge the counts was not plain error.").
321. See Anson IV, 04-CR-6180, 2012 WL 2873832, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012)(purporting to require separate storage devices for separate possession counts, but
not mentioning the common contraband possession test of whether the illicit items
were stored in separate places or acquired at separate times).
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provided adequate evidence at trial as to which firearms were
acquired when (or where).322 No such evidence was presented in
Planck23 or Hinkeldey.24
Instead, both courts relied on the bald assumption that, given the
large number of images each defendant possessed, they simply could
not have acquired all the images at once. 25 When relying solely on
separate acquisitions to support multiple possession offenses, this
assumption makes the number of counts wholly arbitrary because
they are unrelated to any discrete transactions through which the
government showed the defendant acquired different images. If, as
the Planck concurrence proposed, the multiple counts were
supported because the images were obtained at different times-
rather than because they were stored in different places-then each
count would have to be supported by evidence of a specific, separate
transaction leading to the defendant's possession of separate illicit
materials. But, as the Planck concurring judge identified, the
prosecution failed "to present any affirmative evidence or assert any
discrete facts to support the requirement of [the defendant's] having
acquired the images and movies at more than one time." 26
Finally, other cases interpreting the use of "any" in other federal
criminal statutes stress that a statute making a single act (or result of
that act) an offense does not necessarily mean that multiple such acts,
or results, constitute multiple offenses.32 7  Thus, under
322. See, e.g., United States v. Szalkiewicz, 944 F.2d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1991)
(vacating multiple firearms possession counts because the jury made no finding that
the counts were based on separate acquisitions); United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d
282, 294 (10th Cir. 1983) (vacating multiplicitous convictions because the jury did
not find, and was not even asked to find, separate acquisitions, regardless of the
"uncontroverted evidence" in the record that the defendant acquired the firearms at
separate times); United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding
two firearms possession counts based on different firearms because the government
"proved satisfactorily" that the firearms were received at different times (emphasis
added)).
323. 493 F.3d at 507 (Wiener,J., concurring) ("I remain troubled, however, by the
government's failure to present any affirmative evidence or assert any discrete facts
to support the requirement of Planck's having acquired the images and movies at
more than one time.").
324. 626 F.3d at 1014 (declining to address the defendant's argument that he
could only be charged with multiple counts of possession if the images were acquired
through different transactions).
325. See supra text accompanying note 212 (recounting Judge Wiener's remarks
that "it would exceed credulity to conclude that [the defendant] acquired, or could
have acquired, all the images and movies at the very same time").
326. 493 F.3d at 507 (Wiener, J., concurring).
327. See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 156 (2d Cir. 2009) ("That
Congress... intended to prohibit possession of even one item or image containing
child pornography [under § 2252] does not indicate that Congress intended to
permit separate prosecution and punishment for each such item or image
possessed.' (citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted)); United States v.
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§ 2252A(a) (5) (B), although possession of images on a single
computer is sufficient to constitute one offense, it does not
necessarily follow that possession of images on two different devices
in the same home constitutes two offenses. Whether the latter
constitutes one or two offenses depends on what Congress intended
to make the allowable unit of prosecution, if it considered the unit of
prosecution at all.328  Therefore, a much clearer indication of
congressional intent is needed before reaching such a conclusion.
While the Planck, Hinkeldey, and Anson IV opinions assume that
each device or type of medium constitute a separate unit of
prosecution may or may not be reasonable, there is not enough
support for either assumption in the language's plain meaning or in
a comparison to the usage of "any" in other federal criminal
possession statutes. Thus, further analysis is necessary to try to
discern § 2252A's allowable unit of prosecution for possession.
3. Avoiding absurd results
In order to a avoid absurdity, the approaches taken in Planck,
Hinkeldey, and Anson Vshould not be followed. Interpreting the unit
of prosecution as each device or type of medium can lead to absurd
outcomes and result in punishments that are disproportional to the
culpability of the defendants. Both the Planck and Hinkeldey courts
supported their interpretations of § 2252A's possession unit of
prosecution by emphasizing the unfairness of allowing a person who
"amass [es] a warehouse"329 of child pornography to receive only one
count of possession, especially when a person who possesses just a
handful of images on one computer also receives one count.330
This rationale, however, seems to be based on an emotional
inclination to issue as many counts as possible to possessors of child
Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 669 (8th Cir. 1975) ("It does not necessarily follow that,
because possession of a single firearm is sufficient to constitute the evil legislated
against, Congress thereby intended that felons in simultaneous possession of more
than one firearm should be deemed to have committed multiple offenses."); United
States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 529-30 (E.D. Cal.) ("Section 703
makes it clear that killing a single bird is sufficient to create criminal liability; the
section does not, however, indicate that killing more than one bird constitutes more
than one criminal offense. Standing alone, the language could be interpreted either
way. In such a case, the court should examine congressional intent."), affd per curiam,
578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
328. See Kinsley, 518 F.2d at 669 (announcing that, after reviewing the legislative
history, the "allowable unit of prosecution under the statute is simply not
addressed").
329. Planck, 493 F.3d at 504.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 202, 227 (describing the Planck and
Hinkeldey courts' usage of the "amassing a warehouse" argument, despite the fact that
this argument directly contravenes the rule of lenity).
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pornography, rather than on a reasoned decision to link the number
of counts to a defendant's level of culpability. Neither court's
definition of the unit of prosecution successfully avoids the "amassing
a warehouse" problem: a defendant who has thousands of images
saved on one device can only be convicted of one count of child
pornography possession, while a defendant who has a very small
number of images spread across a desktop, a laptop, and a computer
disk can be convicted of three counts of possession under either
court's reasoning.
Ironically, both courts' usage of the "amassing a warehouse"
argument implies that defendants who possess more images are more
culpable than defendants who possess fewer images, yet the courts'
interpretations of the unit of prosecution center on the number of
storage devices (or types of media) rather than on the number of
images. '1 Just as the number of officers in Ladner had "little bearing"
on the gravity of the offense,332 the number or types of storage media
that a defendant possesses does not bear a rational relationship to
that defendant's culpability. The Guidelines, which courts are
required to take under advisement, 33 call for enhanced sentences
based on higher ranges of the total number of images possessed. 34
This avoids the "amassing a warehouse" dilemma because a person
possessing a thousand images-regardless of the devices on which the
images are stored-receives a longer sentence than a person
possessing ten images.
4. Constitutional avoidance
Before turning to the overall statutory scheme, the application of
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is important to address
because double jeopardy concerns are at the forefront of unit of
prosecution multiplicity claims. 33' The Supreme Court stated in
331. See supra text accompanying notes 185-186, 214-216 (discussing how each
court upheld separate counts for separate devices or types of devices, regardless of
how many images each device contained).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 264-267 (describing the Court's
hypothetical where, under a different reading of the statute's unit of prosecution, a
defendant could receive a fifty-year sentence for assault when no actual injury
occurred, but only a ten-year sentence when one person is actually injured).
333. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) (holding that the
mandatory Guidelines were incompatible with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial, but still requiring courts to calculate the now-advisory Guidelines range for
each defendant before finalizing the sentence).
334. See supra note 36 (quoting the Guidelines' incremental increases for higher
ranges of total images).
335. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (explaining that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments in the same proceedings, for
violations of a single statute, based on the same conduct).
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Brown v. Ohio 6 that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a
fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the
simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal
or spatial units."31 7  But this is exactly the approach that the
prosecutions took-and the Fifth and Eighth Circuits approved-in
Planck and Hinkeldey, as did the district court in Anson IV. The
possession counts in all three cases were based on the number or type
of storage media, both of which are spatial units. The prosecutions in
Hinkeldey and Anson IVwent even farther by charging separate counts
for each storage device, rather than just the type of storage
medium. 8
These three courts should have addressed the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance. Just as construing the NLRA in accordance
with the NLRB's wishes would have required the Court to decide
whether such a construction infringed on First Amendment rights in
Catholic Bishop of Chicago,"9 construing § 2252A's possession unit of
prosecution in accordance with the prosecutions' wishes caused the
courts to face Fifth Amendment double jeopardy issues.34 ° Because
the Fifth Amendment does not completely preclude punishing a
person more than once in the same proceeding for the same
conduct, but instead allows Congress to delineate the circumstances
under which such multiple punishment is authorized,3 4" ' the courts
were required to discern the legislative intent on this issue. The
defendants' Fifth Amendment double jeopardy rights were violated if
Congress did not intend to allow the units of prosecution that the
courts sanctioned under § 2252A.
336. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
337. Id. at 169.
338. Compare United States v. Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2010)
(charging the defendant with one count for each of four computer disks, in addition
to one count for a computer and one count for a zip drive), with United States v.
Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 502 (5th Cir. 2007) (charging one count for all 223 diskettes
combined, in addition to one count for a desktop computer and one count for a
laptop computer).
339. See 440 U.S. 490, 490 (1979) (holding that the NLRB did not have
jurisdiction, under the NLRA, over religiously-associated private schools because
such jurisdiction would implicate First Amendment rights under the Religion
Clauses); see also supra text accompanying notes 272-281 (illustrating an application
of the constitutional avoidance doctrine in the context of the NLRA and the First
Amendment).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 272-281 (noting that the Court refused to
construe a statute in a manner that risked violating a constitutional right).
341. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 26, at 1546 (discussing how the Double
Jeopardy Clause is more limited when addressing multiplicity within one case than
when dealing with successive prosecutions because the Clause does not prevent
legislatures from imposing multiple punishments in one case based on how they
choose to define the offenses).
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Rather than deciding that Congress intended § 2252A's possession
unit of prosecution to be singular as to the number or type of storage
devices, the Planck, Hinkeldey, and Anson IV courts should have
acknowledged the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and
construed the statute to encompass all storage devices in one count
of possession, thereby avoiding the double jeopardy question
altogether. Because the allowable unit of prosecution for possession
under § 2252A is unclear, as demonstrated by the application of the
foregoing canons of construction and the following discussion of the
statute's scheme and legislative history, it was not necessary for these
courts to accept the prosecutions' interpretations of the unit of
prosecution and decide whether such interpretations violated the
Fifth Amendment.
5. Whole act rule
Because § 2252A's possession language is not clear on its face or
after employing common canons of construction, courts should look
to the statutory scheme as a whole to shed light on the ambiguous
unit of prosecution. The whole act rule widens the scope of review of
§ 2252A to encompass the overall federal child pornography
legislative scheme including § 2252, as well as § 2252A's other
provisions.
a. Comparison to § 2252
Both § 2252 and § 2252A are part of the chapter entitled "Sexual
Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children" in Title 18 of the United
States Code, and § 2252A is modeled after § 2252.342 Because § 2252
and § 2252A are part of the same federal child pornography
regulatory scheme and are so closely connected to each other,
§ 2252A should be interpreted in congruence with § 2252, rather
than in a way that causes a disjoint between the two sections.
As Polouizzi and Chiaradio illustrate, the possession unit of
prosecution under § 2252 is generally interpreted as encompassing in
one count all storage devices the defendant is found to possess in one
place.143  The test for whether multiple possession counts are
342. See supra Part L.A (providing the historical background and context of
§ 2252A); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (" [W]here ... Congress
adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be
presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated
law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.").
343. See supra Part I.C.3 (briefly relating the courts' reasoning, which is largely
based on the unambiguous language of the statute, for interpreting § 2252 as only
allowing one conviction for illicit material simultaneously possessed).
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permissible is articulated uniformly under both § 2252 and § 2252A:
were the prohibited images possessed at the same time and in the
same place? The simple wording change from "1 or more" to "'any"
led the Planck, Hinkeldey, and Anson IV courts to apply this test more
narrowly under § 2252A, such that each device or medium type is a
separate "place" and thus a separate possession offense. Given
§ 2252A's similarity to § 2252, with the main difference being
§ 2252A's focus on virtual child pornography,344 this change in
interpretation is unwarranted.
The fact that the penalty provision for possession under § 2252A
did not change from § 2252 is evidence that Congress did not intend
higher penalties under § 2252A 45 Despite the penalty provision for
possession being equivalent under both statutes, the Planck, Hinkeldey,
and Anson IV courts essentially changed the penalty for possession
under § 2252A by changing how the unit of prosecution is
interpreted. Under § 2252, simultaneous possession of illicit images
on a computer and on a disk constitutes only one count of
possession, and thus only garners one punishment. In contrast, this
same act of possession can be charged as two counts under § 2252A.46
and so garners two punishments. A court can choose to run the two
sentences consecutively, which increases the defendant's punishment
based solely on the interpretation of the unit of prosecution as each
device or medium type.
In Prince v. United States,347 the Supreme Court refused "to make
drastic changes in authorized punishments" because if "Congress had
so intended, th [at] result could have been accomplished easily with
certainty rather than by indirection." '  But the Planck, Hinkeldey, and
344. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (relating the passage of the
PROTECT Act of 2003, which included the current version of § 2252A).
345. Sections 2252A(b)(2) and 2252(b)(2) both state:
Whoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, [the possession
provision] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both, but if such person has a prior conviction... relating to
aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a
minor or ward, or the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale,
distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography, such person
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor
more than 20 years.
18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (2006); id. § 2252A(b)(2) (omitting a comma following the
first "but" in § 2252A that does not alter the meaning of the provision).
346. This act of possession can be charged as two counts under Planck because
each device is a different type of storage medium and thus a separate count and also
as two counts under Hinkeldey and Anson IV because each device constitutes a
separate count.
347. 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
348. Id. at 328.
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Anson IV courts did just this; they made "drastic changes in
authorized punishments" from § 2252 to § 2252A even though
Congress did not clearly indicate that it intended such a result. If
Congress intended to change the possession unit of prosecution
between § 2252 and § 2252A, the two statutes would likely have
different penalties for possession to reflect the different nature of the
crimes.
b. Section 2252A 's other provisions
Viewing § 2252A's possession provision in the context of § 2252A's
other provisions provides a better picture of the whole statute and
sheds light on the ambiguous unit of prosecution. 4 9 Sections 2252A
and 2252 include an affirmative defense to possession;3 50 both of
which focus on the number of images rather than the number or type
of storage devices.3 51 Congress would have focused on the number of
devices or media instead of on the number of images if it intended
the unit of prosecution to be each device or type of storage medium.
Moreover, according to the unambiguous language of § 2252A(d), a
defendant who possesses two images, even if they are on two separate
devices, is entitled to an affirmative defense, so long as the defendant
promptly destroyed the images or reported them to law enforcement
officials.1
5 2
Additionally, the wording change from "1 or more" to "any" may
have been aesthetic rather than substantive. In Corbin Farm Service,
the court reasoned that the change from the usage of a plural to a
singular noun was not meant to affect the substance of the statute,
but was merely intended to make the language more uniform
349. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 254, at 278 ("A structure-of-the-statute
argument shows how a statute can be read holistically. Not only does each provision
play a role in constructing a coherent policy, but the role played by each provision
helps us see more precisely what role to assign the ambiguous provision.").
350. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d) states:
It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating subsection (a) (5)
that the defendant-(1) possessed less than three images of child
pornography; and (2) promptly and in good faith, and without retaining or
allowing any person, other than a law enforcement agency, to access any
image or copy thereof-(A) took reasonable steps to destroy each such
image; or(B) reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded
that agency access to each such image.
351. This affirmative defense for both § 2252A and § 2252 is for possessing less
than three images. Id.; see also id. § 2252(c) (affirmative defenses).
352. Id. § 2552A(d) (2) (B). The Polouizzi court found § 2252(c)'s similar
affirmative defense to be persuasive in striking down a possession count under
§ 2252's possession provision. United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 155 (2d Cir.
2009).
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throughout the Act at issue. 53 In § 2252, the possession provisions
are the only provisions that provide a numerical value. The other
offenses are all described with relation to "any visual depiction." 54
The drafters of § 2252A may have simply thought to get rid of the
numerical value and replace it with "any" to conform the language of
the possession provision to the language of the other provisions,
which all refer to either "any child pornography"3 5  or "any material
that contains child pornography," 56 in accordance with their § 2252
counterparts.
B. Legislative History
After employing various canons of construction to interpret
§ 2252A's language and looking at § 2252A's overall statutory scheme,
the Planck, Hinkeldey, and Anson IV courts should have looked to
§ 2252A's legislative history for two reasons: (1) to resolve the
ambiguity in the unit of prosecution, and (2) to ensure their
interpretations were not contrary to Congress's intent. The
legislative history of § 2252A clarifies that the statute was enacted
specifically to close the virtual child pornography loophole left open
in § 2252.
The findings published in the CPPA, which included the original
version of § 2252A, focus almost entirely on the effects of technology
on the child pornography market. 57 Additionally, a Senate Report
353. See 444 F. Supp. 510, 529 (E.D. Cal.) (according little weight to the change
from "bird(s)" to "bird" in the statute's language), affd per curiam, 578 F.2d 259 (9th
Cir. 1978); cf. United States v. Taylor, 640 F.3d 255, 258 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that
Congress changed a statutory term solely to "achieve semantic uniformity of
substantively identical prohibitions, rather than to broaden the offense").
354. Section 2252(a) (1) prohibits "transport[ing] ... any visual depiction[.]" 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1). Section 2252(a) (2) prohibits "receiv[ing], or
distribut[ing], any visual depiction[.]" Id. § 2252(a)(2). And § 2252(a) (3) prohibits
'sell[ing] or possess[ing] with intent to sell any visual depiction[.]" Id.
§ 2252(a) (3) (B).
355. Section 2252A(a)(1) prohibits "transport[ing] ... any child pornography[.]"
Id. § 2252A(a) (1). Section 2252A(a) (2) (A) prohibits "receiv[ing] or
distribut[ing] ... any child pornography[.]" Id. § 2252A(a) (2) (A).
356. Section 2252A(a) (2) (B) prohibits "receiv[ing] or distribut[ing] ... any
material that contains child pornography." Id. § 2252A(a) (2) (B).
357. Congress reported the following findings in the CPPA:
(5) new photographic and computer [imaging] technologies make it
possible to produce by electronic, mechanical, or other means, visual
depictions of what appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit
conduct that are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from
unretouched photographic images of actual children engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; (6) computers and computer imaging technology can be
used to-(A) alter sexually explicit photographs, films, and videos in such a
way as to make it virtually impossible for unsuspecting viewers to identify
individuals, or to determine if the offending material was produced using
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discussing the original version of § 2252A states:
This legislation is needed due to technological advances in the
recording, creation, alteration, production, reproduction,
distribution and transmission of visual images and depictions,
particularly through the use of computers. Such technology has
made possible the production of visual depictions that appear to be
of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct which are virtually
indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from unretouched
photographs of actual children engaging in identical sexual
conduct.3 58
This purpose indicates nothing to the effect of changing the unit of
prosecution, but rather only of addressing a new issue-virtual child
pornography-that was not addressed in § 2252.
Lastly, when the Supreme Court in Free Speech Coalition struck down
parts of the CPPA for being unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, 59 Congress responded by enacting the current version of
§ 2252A to bring its virtual child pornography provisions in line with
the Court's holding. The legislative history of the revised version of
§ 2252A focuses entirely on addressing the Supreme Court's
constitutional concerns while continuing to battle virtual child
pornography.1
61
The unit of prosecution is never mentioned in § 2252A's legislative
history.36' Such inattention is not an uncommon occurrence. In
Kinsley, the court found that the "allowable unit of prosecution under
the statute [was] simply not addressed" in the legislative history and
that there was no guidance in the statute's scheme or language. 62
children; (B) produce visual depictions of child sexual activity designed to
satisfy the preferences of individual child molesters, pedophiles, and
pornography collectors; and (C) alter innocent pictures of children to create
visual depictions of those children engaging in sexual conduct
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat.
3009-26, 3009.
358. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7 (1996) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104srpt358/pdf/CRPT-104srpt358.pdf.
359. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002) (striking down 18
U.S.C. § 2256(8), which defined "child pornography" as "'any visual depiction,
including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-enerated
image or picture,' that 'is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexualIy explicit
conduct." (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C.§ 2256(8) (B) (2000))).
360. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REc. 7829 (2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("We were
disappointed some weeks ago, when a majority of the Supreme Court struck down
some key provisions of the [Child Pornography Prevention Act] under the first
amendment.... [T]he decision left some gaping holes in our nation's ability to
prosecute child pornography effectively. We must now act quickly to repair our child
pornography laws to provide for effective law enforcement in a manner that accords
with the Court's ruling.").
361. See id. (containing no reference to the unit of prosecution).
362. United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 669 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Accordingly, the court concluded that the rule of lenity must apply.363
The Planck, Hinkeldey, and Anson 1V courts did not look to the
legislative history of § 2252A."6 Thus, the courts could not address
Congress's lack of discussion of the unit of prosecution and explain
why imputing a singular unit of prosecution, as to each device or type
of medium, to congressional intent was the correct decision.
C. Rule of Lenity
Courts have applied the rule of lenity36 in numerous unit-of-
prosecution cases. As stated in Bell, where there is not sufficient
support for a particular interpretation of an offense's unit of
prosecution, the rule of lenity should apply to prevent courts and
overzealous prosecutors from prescribing greater punishment than
Congress intended.366 As discussed in the foregoing sections, nothing
in § 2252A's language, statutory scheme, or legislative history clearly
indicates that Congress intended the unit of prosecution in the
possession provision to be singular as to either the number or type of
device. 367  There are, however, indicators that Congress did not
intend to change the substance of § 2252A's possession provision
when it switched from "1 or more" to "any." Therefore, the Planck,
Hinkeldey, and Anson !Vcourts should have applied the rule of lenity.
Not only was the rule of lenity not applied in these cases, but
Hinkeldey intentionally chose the harsher of the available
interpretations. The court stated that "even assuming [the term
'any'] is ambiguous, there is a substantial argument that the court
should reject a reading that would punish an offender in possession
of thousands of illicit images in the same manner as an individual in
possession of a single image." 3' This "amassing a warehouse" theory
363. See id. at 670 (invoking the rule of lenity because concluding otherwise would
impermissibly require a court to rely on an assumption of congressional intent).
364. Rather than attempt to interpret the statute using conventional means of
statutory interpretation, Planck looked to analogous precedent in its own circuit, 493
F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 2007); Hinkeldey mainly relied on Planck, United States v.
Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2010); and Anson IV barely gave any
explanation at all, 04-CR-6180, 2012 WL 2873832, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012).
365. See generally ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 254, at 375-82 (reviewing and
comparing cases where the Supreme Court either decided to or refused to apply
lenity).
366. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955) ("[T]his is not out of any
sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy... [ilt merely means ... doubt
will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.").
367. See supra text accompanying notes 342-364 (discussing the ambiguity of
prohibiting possession of "any" material containing child pornography, especially in
relation to § 2252's clearer "one or more" language).
368. Hinkeldey, 626 F.3d at 1014.
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has already been debunked above,3 69 but even if the theory had merit,
it still would not warrant a court's choice of a harsher punishment
without Congress having indicated much more clearly that the statute
authorized such punishment.
These three decisions did not engage in the full analysis that the
unit of prosecution test requires. All three decisions stopped far
short of the proper analysis and assumed that § 2252A's possession
unit of prosecution was either each device or each type of medium.
The repulsive nature of the crimes may have influenced the courts.
However, the Supreme Court has found generalized arguments about
the magnitude of the evil sought to be prevented as insufficient to
avoid the application of the rule of lenity. 7 While the courts'
presumed units of prosecution may or may not have been reasonable,
the rule of lenity is meant to preclude exactly such a "substitution of
assumptions for an undeclared congressional intent." '371
D. Punishment Goals Are Not Better Served by Separate Convictions for Each
Device or Medium Type
According to a 2010 survey, 71% of federal district court judges
believe that the Guidelines are too severe for possession and receipt
offenses. 72 Defining § 2252A's allowable unit of prosecution as each
device or type of medium is not only unsupported by the statute, but
will lead to even more severe and disparate sentences among child
pornography possessors. This definition does not better achieve the
purposes of punishment. Thus, defining 2252A's possession unit of
prosecution in line with the Planck, Hinkeldey, or Anson IV courts will
likely cause more harm than good.
The purposes of punishment are retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.173 Allowing a separate conviction
369. See supra text accompanying notes 329-334 (explaining that under Planck's or
Hinkeldey's reasoning, a defendant can still "amass a warehouse" and receive a single
possession count by simply keeping all illicit images stored on one device, while a
defendant who has a very small number of images spread across a few devices can
receive multiple possession counts).
370. See United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 669 (8th Cir. 1975) (discussing
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344 (1971), superseded by statute, Firearms Owners
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat 449 (1986), as recognized in United States
v. Holland, 841 F. Supp. 143, 145 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1993), a case in which the Court
rejected the government's argument for a broad interpretation of the firearm
possession statute).
371. Id. at 670.
372. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DIsTICT
JUDGESJANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 5 (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/Research
/ResearchProjects/Surveys/20100608_Judge-Survey.pdf.
373. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (instructing a court to consider these
purposes when imposing a sentence); see also Hamilton, supra note 39, at 553
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for each device does not substantially further these purposes. The
number or types of devices used for storage have very little
correlation to a defendant's culpability, and thus do not fairly further
the purpose of retribution.374 Deterrence is not furthered by basing
counts on devices because most individuals would not think that they
could receive two convictions instead of one simply by moving images
that are already in their possession between devices. These
individuals are more likely to think that amassing a large collection of
illegal images could lead to harsher punishments. Defining storage
devices as separate units of prosecution could deter the use of
multiple devices, but it would not deter collecting large amounts of
illicit images onto one device. Breaking up possession offenses based
on storage devices can lead to longer sentences due to the greater
number of counts defendants can be convicted of. But incapacitation
is more harmful than beneficial to society when individuals are
incapacitated longer than necessary because public resources are
expended on needless incapacitation.375
Defining possession by the number or types of devices will
exacerbate the already-serious problem of disparate sentencing.37 6
Sentencing disparities are further exacerbated by prosecutorial
discretion to charge under either § 2252 or § 2252A and to charge
defendants with however many counts the prosecutor wishes. 77 Such
(explaining the Guidelines and their objectives of proportionality and uniformity).
374. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 72, at 1431 (defining retributivism as
the "legal theory by which criminal punishment is justified, as long as the offender is
morally accountable, regardless of whether deterrence or other good consequences
would result"). Therefore, under a retributive theory of punishment, offenders
should only be punished to the extent that they are culpable; punishment that
exceeds the offense goes beyond retribution. Retribution, therefore, does not
support treating possessors of child pornography with sentences disproportionately
larger than their culpability.
375. See Hamilton, supra note 39, at 546 ("[If child pornographers] are subjected
to longer prison sentences than necessary for the purposes of public safety, public
monies and resources expended upon incarceration are wasted.").
376. See Krohel, supra note 29, at 636-37 (providing case illustrations of the
"reluctant rebellion" and criticizing judges for imposing sentences below what was
called for in the Guidelines).
377. Compare United States v. Maupin, 520 F.3d 1304, 1304 (11th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (affirming the conviction of a defendant charged with only one possession
count under § 2252A for, according to his brief to the court, "hard drives and other
forms of digital media storage containing in excess of 110,000 images of child
pornography" (quoting Initial Brief of Appellant at *4, Maupin, 520 F.3d 1304, (No.
07-13341), 2007 WL 3168383)), and United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 541 (7th
Cir. 2001) (charging a defendant with only one possession count under § 2252A for
eight separate videotapes containing child pornography) with Anson IV, 04-CR-6180,
2012 WL 2873832 (W.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012) (upholding thirty-nine counts of
possession under § 2252A for a computer hard drive and thirty-eight computer disks
containing child pornography).
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disparities call into question the fairness and legitimacy of the
criminal justice system. s
Better indicators of culpability, and thus better indicia on which to
base punishment, include the number of images possessed,379 the
nature or content of the images, the defendant's length of
involvement in the child pornography market, the extent to which
the defendant tried to cover up his possession crimes, and the
defendant's criminal history. All of these factors are already taken
into account by the Guidelines, and consequently by sentencing
courts80 because these courts must calculate each defendant's
Guidelines' range and take that range into consideration.381
Therefore, it is unnecessary and even harmful to interpret § 2252A's
possession unit of prosecution as each device or type of medium.
CONCLUSION
The Hinkeldey, Planck, and Anson !Vcourts failed to follow the well-
established method of discerning congressional intent in unit of
prosecution multiplicity claims. This method includes analyzing the
statute's plain language, statutory scheme, and legislative history. If
ambiguity remains after this inquiry, then courts should apply the
rule of lenity and construe the statute in a manner that avoids
assigning more punishment for an offense than Congress intended.
Accordingly, the three courts' bare-bones analyses did not live up to
this standard.
Section 2252A's "any" language is ambiguous and neither the
statutory scheme nor the legislative history support the holdings of
Planck, Hinkeldey, and Anson IV that the unit of prosecution is each
type of storage medium or each individual storage device. Therefore,
§ 2252A's possession provision should be interpreted analogously to
378. See Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 735-36 (discussing how ambiguity as to the
allowable unit of prosecution can lead to inconsistent sentencing, threatens the
appearance of fairness and actual fairness, and weakens confidence in the criminal
justice system).
379. But see U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. ARCARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 8-9 (July 9, 2009), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative-andPublicAffairs/Public-Hearings-andMeeting
s/20090709-10/ArcaraTestimony.pdf ("Is the person who downloads hundreds of
images indiscriminately more dangerous than one who downloads 50 or 60 specific
kinds of images? I don't know.").
380. But see Krohel, supra note 29, at 642-56 (2011) (explaining the enumerated
statutory sentencing factors and arguing that they are not applied consistently
enough).
381. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the
Guidelines are merely advisory, meaning a court must "tailor" a sentence 'in light of
other statutory concerns as well").
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§ 2252's possession provision, such that the unit of prosecution is not
dependent on the number or type of physical storage devices.
There is little efficacy in counting the devices as the unit of
prosecution. Instead, sentence enhancement should be based on the
number of images, as is suggested in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, along with the myriad of other factors described by the
Guidelines. The number of devices and types of storage media
should be irrelevant to both the unit of prosecution and sentencing.
Courts should more closely follow these advisory guidelines when it
comes to sentencing for possession in order to adequately punish
offenders while simultaneously protecting against egregiously
disparate sentences for offenders in possession of similar collections
of illicit materials.

